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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE
DEATH PENALTY: SHIFTING DISCOURSE
Joan Fitzpatrick and Alice Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 1971, the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly afi ed that in order fully to guarantee the right to
life protected by Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights:' "[T]he main objective to be pursued is that of
progressively restricting the number of offenses for which capi-
tal punishment may be imposed, with a view to the desirability
of abolishing this punishment in all countries . . 2 .The re-
cent fruits of this two-decade long abolitionist commitment
appear bountiful. The Second Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), binding
the states parties to the peacetime abolition of the death pen-
alty, was opened for signature on December 15, 1989.? This
action was bracketed by similar codifications of abolition at the
regional level, with the adoption of Protocol No. 6 to the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms in April 1983' and the Protocol to'the
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., pt. 1, at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2. GJA. Res. 2857 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N.
Doc. A/8429 (1971) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2857 (XXVI)].
3. G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 206, U.N. Doc.
A/441824 (1989), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990).
4. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signa-
BROOK. J. 1NT'L L.
American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty in June 1990.'
. But this apparent march toward the abolitionist millenni-
um is deceiving. None of the international commitments to
abolition has been achieved without struggle and dissent. In-
deed, in recent years the discourse about abolition of the death
penalty in international fora has taken a negative turn, with
opposing states less often arguing that their societies are sim-
ply too imperfect to be ready for the abolitionist ideal and more
often asserting that the ideal society is one that preserves
execution. This change in the tone of the international debate
can be traced to the greater aggressiveness of certain
retentionist states, reflecting in particular the religiously based
views of Islamic states and the more confrontational posture of
the United States.
To speak of shifts in discourse about the death penalty will
strike many as an impossibility. The arguments for and
against capital punishment are wearily familiar, and as long
ago as 1793 a Columbia College student (later to become an
abolitionist governor of the State of New York) referred to
abolition as "an old thread bare subject."" Scholars delight in
discovering identical debates on the death penalty occurring in
vastly different time periods and societies.7 Authors of new
books or articles on the death penalty generally feel compelled
ture Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1985), reprinted
in 22 I.L.M. 538 (1983).
5. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1447
(1990).
6. PHILIP E. MACKEY, HANGING IN THE BALANCE: Tim MAqTI-CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE, 1776-1861, at 53 (1982) (quoting DANIEL D.
TOMPKINS, A COLuMBIAN COLLEGE STUDENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: ESSAYS
BY DANIEL D. TOMPKINS 21-23 (1990)).
7. See, e.g., two articles in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967):
William M. Green, An Ancient Debate on Capital Punishment 46 (describing debate
between Caesar and Cato on the fate of the Catiline conspirators and its resem-
blance to modem arguments); and Finn Homum, Two Debates: France, 1791; Eng-
land, 1956, 55 (using the device of parallel columns to display the similarities in
legislative debates in the two times and places).
274 [Vol. XIX:2
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
to explain or apologize for writing on a subject on which debate
appears to recycle rather than to evolve.'
But little has been written concerning the tenor of debate
on abolition of the death penalty within international fora. The
international debate is distinct from that at the national level.
However, the two have complex interrelationships, and fluctua-
tions in national debate will cause a particular state to shift
position on the international plane.
One of the key issues in international discourse on the
death penalty is whether the discourse should occur at all, or
whether capital punishment lies within the realm of purely
domestic affairs. Some retentionist states have begun to assert
that the death penalty cannot be made the subject of interna-
tional human rights norms, even norms that bind only ratify-
ing abolitionist states, because such norms lack universality.
In contrast to this attempted exclusion of abolition from legiti-
mate international discourse, debate on the death penalty at
the national level is generally conceded to be legitimate. In-
deed, in many societies the debate is constant or recurring.
Comparison of the experiences of abolitionist versus
retentionist states9 has been central to international discourse
on the death penalty, regardless of whether the focus is on the
social scientific aspects (such as comparative crime rates), or
on the possibility or impossibility of agreement on moral and
philosophical principles. Attention to the experiences of other
countries has varied widely in national debates over aboli-
8. Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins refer to the death penalty as a
subject "embedded in cliche and sentiment," but one about which there are new
things to say. FRANKLIN E. ZImmING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA xiii (1986). Roger Hood prefaced his recent study with
the remark that "no one can embark upon a study of the death penalty without
making the commonplace observation that from a philosophical and policy stand
point there appears to be nothing new to be said." ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY 6 (1989).
9. G.A. Res. 1396 (XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 23, U.N.
Doc. A/4354 (1959), launched the continuing UN efforts to study "the effects of
capital punishment, and the abolition thereof, on the rate of criminality," by gath-
ering and analyzing data from states.
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tion, ° influenced by the varying dominance of cosmopolitan
versus parochial outlooks.
A striking aspect of the death penalty debate at both inter-
national and national levels is the tremendous-some might
say inordinate-attention paid to a penal practice that affects
an extremely small percentage of even the convicted population
in any part of the world. Yet, the debate remains passionate
and profoundly important. As Franklin Zimring and Gordon
Hawkins note: "Capital punishment is an issue of largely sym-
bolic importance, but symbols count."" The symbolic impor-
tance of the death penalty in current international discourse
10. In 1864, for example, a Royal Commission on Capital Punishment was
established by the British Home Secretary. The Royal Commission analyzed data,
obtained from British ambassadors and colonial officials, on execution practices in'
other countries and colonies. Two hundred and forty-five of the seven hundred and
twenty-three pages in the Royal Commission's report concerned execution practices
in Europe, South America, North America, and Australia. Influenced by this *data,
the Royal Commission proposed an end to public executions. The four abolitionist
members of the Royal Commission dissented from this recommendation, reflecting
the widely held belief by abolitionists of the time that an end to the public specta-
cle of executions would retard progress toward abolition rather than promote it.
DAVID D. COOPER, THE LESSON OF THE SCAFFOLD 126-45 (1974). Comparative data
on capital punishment laws and practices were also compiled by the United King-
dom Select Committee on Capital Punishment in 1930-31. REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMM=ITIE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, REPORTS FROM COM-
MITTEES 1030-31, vol. VI (2). Arthur Koestler quotes the Select Committee conclu-
sion from its "prolonged examination of the situation in foreign countries", that
"capital punishment may be abolished in this country without endangering life or
property, or impairing the security of Society." ARTHUR KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON
HANGING 60 (1956). Similar comparative data were also considered by the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment of 1948-53, leading to similar conclusions. Id.
at 60-61.
In contrast, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality in Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989), rejected comparative and international data in determining
whether the execution of juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. "We emphasize
that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the con-
tention of petitioners and their various amici . . .that the sentencing practices of
other countries are relevant." Id. at 369 n.1. His views echo those of Sir James
Fitzjames Stephens, writing in the June 1864 issue of FRASER'S MAGAZINE, reject-
ing the persuasive force of execution practices in other countries on the ground
that the people of England were "more alive" to the need for harsh criminal laws.
COOPER, supra, at 70.
11. ZIURING & HAWKINS, supra note 8, at xiv.
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has three divergent aspects: (1) the pursuit of gradual restric-
tions and eventual abolition of the death penalty as part of the
progressive development of international human rights norms,
and the associated transformation of the relationship between
the individual and the state; (2) the marked tendency of post-
repressive governments, in nations as diverse as the Philip-
pines, Namibia, and Romania, 2 to announce the abolition of
the death penalty as verification of their bona fide transforma-
tion into democracies; and, (3) the use of the death penalty as
a battleground over cultural relativity and exclusive national
sovereignty in international human rights law. The death
penalty remains equally symbolic at the national level, serving
the needs of repressive governments and politicians for a stark
emblem of their ruthlessness against certain politically or
socially disfavored elements or of their responsiveness to
crime-related fears, while simultaneously providing a rallying
point for those seeking to challenge the idea of absolute state
power over the lives of individuals.
In this article, we will trace the patterns of international
discourse on the death penalty through six phases: (1) the
period of the late 1940s and early 1950s during which the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights," the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949,'4 and the European Convention on Human
Rights 5 were drafted, when the death penalty was not yet
fully recognized as a human rights issue; (2) the period of the
late 1950s and 1960s during which the final draft of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)"6 was
12. The Philippines abolished the death penalty in 1987 upon restoration of
democracy. Romania abolished the death penalty in 1989 after its revolution.
Namibia abolished the death penalty in 1990 upon achieving its independence. The
Death Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, Feb. 1993, at 1-6
(available from Amnesty InVl, New York, N.Y., AI Index: ACT 50/01/93) [hereinaf-
ter List].
13. See Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
14. Especially relevant is the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
15. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
16. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
1993] 277
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adopted and the UN began its examination of the death penal-
ty as a criminological issue; (3) the period of the 1970s when
the UN General Assembly committed itself to the abolitionist
objective and the American Convention on Human Rights in-
creased restrictions on the death penalty; 7 (4) the period of
the late 1970s and early 1980s when international attention
shifted from judicial imposition of the death penalty toward
the phenomena of extrajudicial executions and disappearances;
(5) the period of the 1980s during which the abolitionist proto-
cols" were drafted; and, (6) the period of the 1990s, marked
by slow ratification of the abolitionist protocols, increasing
contentiousness of death penalty discussions in international
fora, complex shifts in the imagery of abolition, and reimposi-
tion of the death penalty at the national level.
Our focus throughout will be on arguments for and against
abolition of the death penalty as a matter of international
human rights law, paying attention to debates over incremen-
tal measures, such as exemptions for juveniles and pregnant
women, fair process safeguards, rights of appeal, or requests
for commutation, only as they cast light on the larger abolition
debate. While shifts in the nature of the discourse have some-
times been subtle, they have been real. Concrete progress to-
ward abolition through discourse at the international level
requires an understanding of these shifts and the factors that
have driven them.
II. THE EARLY POSTWAR PERIOD
Revulsion against the atrocities committed by fascist re-
gimes before and during the Second World War provided the
dramatic impetus toward the creation of the modern interna-
tional system for the protection of human rights. But, the
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
17. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 [hereinafter O.A.S.T.S. No. 36].
18. See supra notes 3-5.
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death sentences meted out to war criminals and collaborators
by international 9 and national tribunals" during the imme-
diate postwar era signal the failure of the international com-
munity to embrace abolition of the death penalty as a bedrock
principle of human rights. The international community codi-
fied a prohibition on genocide,2' but conceptualized genocide
as a crime22 rather than as a punishment, as its perpetrators
tended to perceive it.2
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights24 contains
two articles whose general terms might be construed to prohib-
it the imposition of capital punishment. Article 3 sparely pro-
vides that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and the
security of person."' Article 5, in equally laconic style, pro-
vides that "[nlo one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."26 While- the
19. Seven of the 28 Japanese wartime leaders placed on trial for war crimes
were sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
20 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEED-
INGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN TWENTY-
Two VOLUMES 48, 425-26 (R. Pritchard & S. Zaide eds., 1981). Of the 23 defen-
dants in the "Case Against the Nazi Physicians," one of the several prosecutions
at Nuremberg, seven were executed. Alexander Mitscherlich & Fred Mielke,- Epi-
logue: Seven Were Hanged, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 105,
105-07 (George Annas & Michael Grodin eds., 1992).
20. For example, following World War II, Belgium, which had been de facto
abolitionist since 1863 for ordinary crimes, executed a number of persons for trea-
son. Sweden, which by statute had abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes
in 1921, also executed wartime collaborators and did not abolish the death penalty
for such offenses until 1972. Report on the Abolition of Capital Punishment by Mr.
Lidbom, Eur. Consult. Ass., 32d Sess., Doc. No. 4509 at 15-16, 19 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Libdom Report].
21. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
22. Id. at art. 1.
23. LEON S. SHELEFF, ULTIMATE PENALTIES: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, LIFE IM-
PRISONMENT, PHYSICAL TORTURE 5 (1987).
24. See Universal Declaration, supra note 1. A very useful summary of discus-
sions on the death penalty during the drafting of the Universal Declaration and
the ICCPR is presented by Lilly E. Landerer, Capital Punishment as a Human
Rights Issue Before the United Nations, 4 R. D. DE LVHOMME 511 (1971).
25. Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
26. Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
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drafters of these articles did not intend to mandate immediate
abolition of the death penalty, there is evidence in the drafting
history of a common aspiration toward eventual abolition. This
resulted in deletion of explicit references to capital punishment
as an exception to the right to life, set the stage for the later
commitment of the UN to abolition, and indicated early recog-
nition of the death penalty as inescapably implicating human
rights issues.
The Drafting Committee, established in 194727 at the first
session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, received
proposals for an international bill of rights from the UN Secre-
tariat,' Chile,29 the United Kingdom, ° and the United
States,"' all of which made specific death penalty exceptions
to the right to life under some circumstances.32 Yet, during
the Drafting Committee's sessions in the summer of 1947, the
death penalty exceptions to the right to life were dropped,
based on a consensus within the Drafting Committee that
many states were moving toward abolition and that the UN's
basic statement of human rights principles should not appear
to approve the death penalty.
27. U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.12 (1947).
28. Draft Outline of an International Bill of Human Rights: Report of the
Drafting Committee, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Annex 1, at art. 3, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/21 (1947) [hereinafter Draft Outline].
29. Draft Declaration prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee:
Report of the Government of Chile, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2 (1947).
30. Report of the Drafting Committee to the Commission on Human Rights,
U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Annex B, at art. 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/21 (1947) [hereinaf-
ter United Kingdom Draft].
31. United States Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in Draft for an
International Bill of Human Rights: Report of the Drafting Committee, U.N.
ESCOR, 1st Sess., Annex C, at art. 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/21 (1947).
32. The Secretariat draft, supra note 28, simply referred to persons convicted
of crimes under laws providing for the death penalty. The draft submitted by
Chile, supra note 29, specified that the death penalty should be imposed only for
the "gravest" crimes; the draft submitted by the United States, supra note 31,
added a series of specific procedural protections in capital cases (competent and
impartial tribunal, conformity with established law, fair public trial, right to con-
front witnesses, right to compulsory process for witnesses, right to counsel).
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Eleanor Roosevelt, serving simultaneously as Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights and Chairman of the Draft-
ing Committee, noted the "movement underway in some States
to wipe out the death penalty completely" and suggested "it
might be better not to use the phrase 'death penalty."3 ' Pro-
fessor Rene Cassin of France concurred, making a distinction
between adherence to the aspiration of abolition and imposi-
tion of an immediately binding obligation to eliminate the
death penalty.3' Professor Koretsky of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), citing the example of his country,
which was then in one of its brief' abolitionist phases,35
stressed that the UN "should not in any way signify approval
of the death penalty." 6 Strikingly, Mr. Santa Cruz of Chile"
and Mr. Wilson of the United Kingdom agreed with Professor
Koretsky that the UN "should not sanction the death penal-
ty,"3 8 though their governments were retentionist and had
submitted drafts containing specific death penalty exceptions
to the right to life.
Thus, the general language of Article 3 of the Universal
Declaration, as it emerged from the Drafting Committee in the
summer of 1947, does appear to embody a consensus that abo-
lition of the death penalty is a common human rights aspira-
tion for all nations, though some may face delays in achieving
that objective. This consensus appears to have held in the
33. U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., 2d mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2 (1947)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.I/SR.21.
34. Id. Cassin stated that "if the principle of universal abolition of the death
penalty could be adopted, it should not impose a strict obligation on States which
wished to maintain the death penalty." Id.
35. The death penalty in the USSR was abolished by a decree in May 1947,
but restored in July 1950 for traitors, spies and saboteurs, and in 1954 for pre-
meditated murder. A 1958 criminal code revision extended the death penalty even
further, and statutes in 1960 and 1961 extended it to certain economic crimes.
U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at 32, U.N.
Doc. ST/SOA]SD/9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4IAC.1]SR.2, U.N. Sales No. E67.1V.1S, (1962)
[hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT].
36. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4IAC.1/SR.2, supra note 33, at 11.
37. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, supra note 33, at 11.
38. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4JAC.1JSR.2, supra note 33, at 11.
1993]
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Commission on Human Rights, which approved the Drafting
Committee's approach. 9
A proposal by the USSR in the Third Committee of the
General Assembly at its Third Session in 1948 to amend Arti-
cle 3 to provide that "[t]he death penalty should be abolished
in time of peace" provoked a "lively discussion, ' o but one that
reinforced the UN's acceptance at that time of an ultimate
abolitionist goal. While the USSR amendment was rejected by
a vote of twenty-one against, nine in favor, with eighteen ab-
stentions,41 the warning by the representative of the United
Kingdom that "a vote on the amendment submitted by the
USSR could in no way be interpreted as a vote for or against
the abolition of the death penalty'"2 appears well-taken. In-
39. Mr. A.C.C. Victoria of Uruguay submitted an unsuccessful proposal to pro-
hibit the death penalty for political offenses:
Human life is inviolable. The State shall grant protection to all
persons born or those suffering from incurable diseases and those physi-
cally or mentally deficient are also entitled to it.
The right to life includes the right of obtaining from the State
minimum standards for a dignified and worthy life.
The death penalty shall never be applied to political offenders.
With regard to criminal offenders, it shall only be applied after sentence
rendered under existing laws after a trial with the necessary guarantees
for a just sentence.
U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., 35th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.35 (1947).
The Commission never took as a basis of discussion a proposal by Ecuador
which, inter alia, called for prohibition of the death penalty ("There shall be no
death penalty") and extended the right to life to the "moment of conception." Draft
Charter of International Human Rights and Duties submitted by the Delegation of
Ecuador, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/32 (1947).
40. Landerer, supra note 24, at 517.
41. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 107th mtg. at 185, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.107 (1948).
. 42. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 103d mtg. at 159, U.N. Doe.
A/C.3/SR.103 (1948) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.103]. The political tone of the
debate adds to the difficulty in interpreting the vote on the USSR proposal. The
Soviet representative called for a roll-call vote as "a means of testing the sincerity
of representatives who had defended the right of the individual to life" and framed
his proposal with sharp attacks on lynching in the United States and on British
colonial practices. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 102d mtg. at 142, 149, 150-51,
U.N. Doe. AIC.3/SR.102 (1948) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.102]. This attack
and the response led the Mexican representative to remark that "[iun the last few
meetings the debate had in fact been in the main confined to a verbal duel be-
282
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deed, the tone of the debate reflects an overwhelming accep-
tance of abolition as a goal, with only isolated expressions of
dissent on grounds that the death penalty was purely a matter
for domestic penal policy.43
Some representatives objected to the USSR proposal be-
cause it did not also prohibit the death penalty in times of
war" and might not have included de facto death sentences of
confinement in concentration and forced labor camps.4" Others
tween the representatives of the major Powers, with representatives of countries of
lesser importance attending in the role of worried and helpless spectators." U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 104th mtg. at 163, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.104 (1948)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.104].
43. This view was expressed by the representatives of Turkey, U.N. Doe,
AIC.3/sR. 103, supra note 42, at 158 ("His delegation would vote against the ...
amendment because it considered that it was not for the Committee to decide on
the abolition of the death penalty, a highly controversial principle which a number
of countries had not yet accepted."); Guatemala, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess.,
105th mtg. at 179, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.105 (1948) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.105] (urging the Committee to avoid a subject on which "[w]hole volumes
had been written" and noting that in 1945 Guatemala had after debate chosen to
retain the death penalty in restricted form; he was of the opinion that abolition of
the death penalty "depended upon the particular circumstances of each country
... ."); and abolitionist Brazil, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.103, supra note 42, at 155
("The death penalty was not provided for in the legislation of Brazil, but the' Bra-
zilian delegation believed, nevertheless, that it was not for the Third Committee to
make a decision on a question which was essentially one of penal law.") The rep-
resentative of Syria made a more equivocal statement that the USSR proposal
"raised questions which were within the scope of the penal code" but suggested
that it could be studied at a later stage and could form a separate recommenda-
tion. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.103, supra note 42, at 156.
44. Mr. Plaza of Venezuela stated that "the second part, referring to the aboli-
tion of the death penalty in time of peace, implied that such punishment would be
legal in time of war. That idea was contrary to the laws of Venezuela which guar-.
anteed the inviolability of human life at all times." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.102, supra
note 42, at 149. He reiterated that "Venezuela would have voted in favour of
the . . . amendment dealing with the abolition of the death penalty in time of
peace, if the USSR proposal had envisaged the complete abolition of the death
penalty." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.104, supra note 42, at 167. Venezuela abstained in
the vote on the USSR proposal. See also U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.105, supra note 43, at
175 (Mr. Cafias of Costa Rica stated that "[hie would abstain from voting on the
proposed abolition of the death penalty because he considered it insufficient in
that it was restricted to time of peace.").
45. The representative of France noted that "[hie was, himself, in favour of
the abolition of the death penalty; but if a recommendation to that effect were
included in the declaration, it would have to be carefully defined, so as to 'cover
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feared that prohibition in "time of peace" would interfere with
on-going prosecutions of war criminals.46 The opposition em-
phasized the need to retain the concise draft of Article 3 pre-
pared by the Commission 4  and the greater suitability of the
covenant to deal with details of restrictions on the right to
life." While a call for immediate abolition in the Universal
Declaration was perceived as "controversial,"49 no state indi-
cated explicit dissent from the sentiment that would later be
reflected in General Assembly Resolution 2857 (XXVI), in favor
of universal abolition as soon as possible.
the practice of sending prisoners to concentration camps .... " U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR. 102, supra note 42, at 146.
46. The Belgian representative indicated an intent to abstain because the pro-
posal was vague on whether "[w]ar criminals and collaborators" could be executed.
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.103, supra note 42, at 157. The representative of Denmark
noted that although the death penalty had been abolished in her country for a
long time, it had been reintroduced for a short time for "events arising out of the
war." She warned that a roll-call vote would "only result in confusion" because
some abolitionist states would vote against and some retentionist states had indi-
cated an intent to vote in favor. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.105, supra note 43, at 179-80.
The representative of the Netherlands stated that his delegation "agreed in princi-
ple" with the USSR proposal to abolish the death penalty, except for war crimi-
nals and traitors, but "thought that it had no place in a declaration of human
rights"; instead, it should be included in a "separate declaration of the rights and
duties of the State." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.103, supra note 42, at 158.
47. See, e.g., Remarks of the Representatives of the United States, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.102, supra note 42, at 146; Chile, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.102, supra note 42,
at 147; China, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.103, supra note 42, at 153; France, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.103, supra note 42, at 154; Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.103, supra
note 42, at 157.
48. See, e.g., Remarks of the Representatives of the United States, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.102, supra note 42, at 147; China, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.105, supra note 43,
at 177; France, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.105, supra note 43, at 178. Several representa-
tives, such as the representative of Ecuador, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.104, supra note
42, at 169, and the representative of Uruguay, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.105, supra note
43, at 173, indicated that the death penalty would be better dealt with in another
article of the Universal Declaration, while others, such as the representative of
Peru, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.104, supra note 42, at 168, and the representative of
Pakistan, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.105, supra note 43, at 177, felt that it would be
better dealt with in a separate resolution of the General Assembly.
49. See, e.g., Remarks of the Representative of Haiti, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.105,
supra note 43, at 172; and the Representative of Bolivia, who found the subject
too controversial but "did not want to appear to approve the death penalty ...
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.105, supra note 43, at 174.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
The postwar impulse to prevent recurrence of the recent
atrocities extended beyond the relatively new field of human
rights to that of humanitarian law. Concern about mass execu-
tions motivated by racial, religious, and political hostility
prompted attention to measures to restrict the application of
the death penalty in future wars-both in the case of combat-
ants and noncombatants. Indeed, the International Committee
of the Red Cross, in preparatory meetings leading to the diplo-
matic conference that would draw up the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, went so far as to propose that the death penalty
should be abolished entirely in the postwar recodification of
humanitarian law.o This suggestion failed because some op-
ponents expressed concern that the inclusion of an abolition re-
quirement might restrict the number of states ratifying the
conventions or lead to excessively broad invocations of emer-
gency exceptions.5 However, drafters of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 managed to restrict the death penalty in a num-
ber of significant ways.
These restrictions primarily concern the status of the po-
tential victims of the death penalty and strict procedural re-
quirements. Postwar codifications of humanitarian law intro-
duced the exemption for juveniles52 that was later incorporat-
ed into human rights treaties. The procedural restrictions took
several forms: (1) limitations on the nature of the offenses for
which the death penalty could be imposed;" (2) prohibitions
on the extension of the death penalty by an occupying power
beyond the prewar scope established by the government of an
occupied territory;' (3) prescription of basic procedural fair-
50. INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE WORK OF
THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF THE CONVENTIONS
FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 230-31 (1947).
51. Id. at 231.
52. For example, Article 68 of Geneva Convention IV prohibits the execution
of a protected person who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the of-
fense. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14.
53. Article 68 of Geneva Convention IV limits the permissible application of
the death penalty to espionage, "serious" acts of sabotage, and intentional homi-
cide. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14.
54. This issue aroused controversy, with the United States among others rath-
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ness for the imposition of the death penalty against protected
persons;55 and, (4) extension of prescribed delays after the
imposition of death penalties for the purpose of intercession by
the condemned person's protecting power.6
Given this detailed consideration of the death penalty in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it is rather surprising that
the subject received so little consideration in the drafting of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms 7 during roughly the same time
period. Throughout much of the drafting process of the Euro-
pean Convention, the participants were divided over the basic
approach, between proponents of a precise definition model"
and proponents of an enumeration model. 9 Neither approach
er implausibly arguing that soon-to-be-occupied nations would rapidly abolish the
death penalty in order to prevent the occupying power from imposing the death
penalty against resistance forces, thus taking advantage of Article 68(2) of Geneva
Convention IV. JEAN PICTET, COMIMENTARY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION VOL. IV
345 (1958) ("The United States reserves the right to impose the death penalty . . .
without regard to whether the offenses referred to therein are punishable by death
under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation begins.").
55. Article 71 of Geneva Convention IV requires a regular trial by a compe-
tent court and written notice of charges; Article 72 permits the accused to present
defense evidence and a right to assistance by counsel or advocate; Article 75 guar-
antees condemned persons a right to petition for pardon or reprieve. Geneva Con-
vention IV, supra note 14.
56. Article 75 of Geneva Convention IV provides that no death sentence can
be carried out, except in case of grave emergency, before the expiration of six
months after the receipt by the protecting power of notification of the final judg-
ment confirming the death sentence or denying pardon or reprieve. Geneva Con-
vention IV, supra note 14.
For a general description of the death penalty provisions of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols see M. Sassoli, La Peine de Mort en
Droit International Humanitaire et Dans 'Action du Comite International de la
Croix-Rouge, 58 R.I.D.P. 583 (1987).
57. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, supra note 15.
58. The precise definition model would prescribe in detail both the rights to
be guaranteed and their permissible limitations.
59. Drawing largely from the Universal Declaration, the enumeration model
simply listed the rights, with a general limitations clause, or offered a vague col-
lective guarantee for existing protections for human rights in national laws. See 1
COuNcIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" 92
(1975) [hereinafter 1 TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES] (discussion within the Consultative
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appears to have envisioned using the occasion of drafting the
European Convention as an opportunity for abolishing the
death penalty within Europe.
During the early stages of the drafting, when the enumer-
ation model was in the ascendant, the Consultative Assembly
considered a draft prepared by the European Movement that
simply guaranteed "security of life and limb."" The Commit-
tee on Legal and Administrative Questions urged that only
those rights and freedoms "defined and accepted after long
usage, by the democratic regimes" could realistically be pro-
tected in the new human rights convention.6
Caution appears to have dominated the drafting process,
even after enumeration was jettisoned in favor of precise defi-
nition. The United Kingdom representative made a proposal
modeled upon the then-current draft UN human rights cove-
nant, and Article 2 of the European Convention 2 was adopted
with little discussion." Article 2 left the states parties free to
Assembly in August 1949, discussing draft prepared by the International Judicial
Section, which proposed collective guarantees of existing national legal protections);
3 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TEAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 254-62 (1976) [hereinafter 3
TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES] (discussion of division of opinion between proponents of
precise definition/enumeration approaches in Preliminary Draft Report by Commit-
tee of Experts to the Committee of Ministers, Doc. CMIWP 1 (50) 1, 24 Feb.
1950).
60. 1 TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES, supra note 59, at 296 (draft convention pre-
pared by European Movement).
61. 1 TEAVAUX PREPARATOIRES, supra note 59, at 218 (Teitgen Report).
62. The text of the United Kingdom proposal read:
1) No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution
of the sentence of the court following his conviction of a crime for which
his [sic] penalty is defined by law.
2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as intentional when it results
from the use of force, which is no more than absolutely necessary
a) in defense of any person from unlawful violence,
b) in order to effect lawful arrest or to prevent an escape from
lawful custody;
c) any action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection or for prohibiting entry to clearly defined places to
which access is forbidden on grounds of national security.
3 TR&VAUX PREPARATOIRES, supra note 59, at 186.
63. The Committee of Ministers was offered a choice between the United
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continue imposing death sentences, as long as the crime and
penalty were previously defined in law-a limitation that was
not only modest but duplicative of the general nulla poene sine
lege provision of Article 7(1) of the Convention."
During this early period the death penalty received clear
recognition as an international human rights issue. The sub-
stantial restrictions imposed in the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the more modest limits of the European Convention
did not signal any commitment to total abolition, however. It
was in the debates over the drafting of the Universal Declara-
tion that eventual abolition of the death penalty emerged as a
principle of the new international system for the protection of
human rights. Agreement on that principle remained at best
implicit in the text of the Universal Declaration.
III. CONCERN WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS-THE COVENANT
AND SOCIAL DEFENSE
Within the UN, the period of the 1950s and the 1960s was
characterized by two significant developments: (1) confronta-
tion of the death penalty as a human rights issue in the draft-
ing of the ICCPR, leading to important limitations on its per-
Kingdom proposal in the context of a "precise definition" draft, or a rather indefi-
nite guarantee of "life, liberty and security of person" in an enumeration-style
draft, both forwarded by the Committee of Experts in March 1950. 3 TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES, supra note 59, at 312-20. In June 1950, the Committee of Minis-
ters referred the matter to a Conference of Senior Officials which opted for the
precise definition model. 4 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE
"TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 182(1977). Little attention was paid to Article 2 during debate in the Consultative
Assembly in August 1950, aside from discussion of an unsuccessful proposal to
include an explicit reference to genocide. Id. at 64, 80; 5 COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
COLLECTED EDITION OF THE 'TEAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 258 (1979).
64. Article 7(1) provides:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time
the criminal offence was committed.
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missible scope and tentative adherence to abolition as a goal;
and, (2) recognition of the death penalty as a matter of legiti-
mate concern for international penology. Each of these trends
contributed to the recognition of the death penalty as an inter-
national issue, and erosion of the view that the death penalty
was purely a matter of domestic concern.
The drafting process of the ICCPR actually began as early
as 1947, when the Commission on Human Rights undertook
the task of preparing the "International Bill of Human Rights,"
which only later assumed the guise of a declaration and .two
separate treaties." The Drafting Committee, appointed by the
Commission, decided in July 1947 to draft two instruments-a
declaration and a convention." Proposals for the convention's
right to life article took several forms, none of which had a
strong abolitionist thrust." The United Kingdom proposal
from July 1947 placed only limited formalist restrictions on the
death penalty, in language almost identical to that later in-
corporated into Article 2(1) of the European Convention." An
early United States proposal contained both substantive and
procedural limits on the death penalty, rather similar to those
that would be included in the final draft. 9 Yet, later in 1947,
65. These are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). For
discussion of early drafting efforts, see Landerer, supra note 24, at 513-14.
66. Draft Outline, supra note 28, at 3, 12.
67. Ecuador submitted to the General Assembly a "Draft Charter of Inferna-
tional Rights and Duties" which provided in its Article I that "[t]here shall be no
death penalty." Although this proposal was referred to the Commission in Novem-
ber 1947, it did not become a focus for discussion in relation to the ICCPR. See
supra note 39; Landerer, supra note 24, at 515 n.12.
68. The United Kingdom proposal for the UN convention provided, "It shall be
unlawful to deprive any person of his life save in the execution of the sentence of
a court following on his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by
law." United Kingdom Draft, supra note 30, at Annex G, art. 1 at 62.
69. The proposal read:
The right to life is fundamental and may not be denied to any
person except upon conviction of the gravest of crimes under general law
providing for the penalty of death.
No one shall be deprived of life or personal liberty, or be convicted
or punished for a crime in any manner, save by judgment of a competent
and impartial tribunal, in conformity with law, after a fair and public
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both the United States and the Commission's Working Group
on the Convention had shifted to the minimalist approach
favored by the United Kingdom."°
However, in 1949 the Commission defined further limits
on the permissible application of the death penalty, including a
restriction to the most serious crimes, a requirement of sen-
tence by a competent court, a prohibition on retroactive death
penalties, limitation of penalties to those consistent with the
principles of the Universal Declaration, and a preservation of
the possibility of amnesty, commutation, or pardon. 1 During
the lengthy debates, only occasional mention was made of the
prospect for total abolition, with the USSR deciding not to
push the issue in light of the General Assembly's failure to
include abolition in the Universal Declaration."
Although the entire issue was reopened at the
Commission's Sixth Session in 1950,"s the text was only
changed minimally. 4 With Uruguay taking the lead, greater
trial ....
Draft Outline, supra note 28, at Annex C, art. 8 at 41.
70. In December 1947, the Working Group submitted a draft that simply
stated: "It shall be unlawful to deprive any person of his life, save in the execu-
tion of the sentence of a court following on his conviction of a crime for which
this penalty is provided by law." Report of the Working Party on an International
Convention on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/56
(1947). This tracks the language of the United Kingdom's proposal, supra note 30,
and is identical to a proposal submitted by the United States in November 1947.
Proposal For Human Rights Convention, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 4, U.N.
Doc. EICN.4137 (1947).
Comments submitted by Uruguay and Brazil during 1948 suggested the
addition of an exception to the death penalty for political or "merely political"
offenses. See Comments from Governments on the Draft International Declaration
on Human Rights, Draft International Convention on Human Rights and the Ques-
tion of Implementation, U.N. ESCOR, 3d Seas., at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Add.2
(1948).
71. U.N. ESCOR, 9th Seas., Supp. No. 10, at 27, U.N. Doc. E11371 (1949).
72. Mr. Pavlov of the USSR found it "a pity" that the "backward legislation of
some countries" prevented adoption of the abolitionist position. U.N. ESCOR, 5th
Sess., 91st mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.91 (1949).
73. Landerer comments that this "was not too surprising in view of the rela-
tively small majority" (of eight in favor, six opposed, and one abstention) obtained
at the Fifth Session. See Landerer, supra note 24, at 520-21.
74. The most noteworthy change was a clarification that the condemned per-
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discussion of the abolitionist perspective occurred. 5 Uruguay
asserted that if total abolition was not an attainable goal, the
Commission should nevertheless make "every effort" to limit
the application of the death penalty, "particularly with regard
to children, pregnant women and women in general ..... 76
Uruguay's abolitionist view prompted several responses. Aus-
tralia simply objected that its own constitution was not aboli-
tionist,77 while Chile made the pragmatic argument that the
instrument should be drafted so as to maximize the number of
possible signatories,78 both being variants on the "least com-
mon denominator" approach to human rights drafting. Egypt,
inspired by its own national law, made the first, unsuccessful
effort to exempt juveniles from the death penalty.79 The only
real concession to the abolitionist perspective was insertion of
the prefatory phrase, "[iun countries where capital punishment
son "had the right to seek amnesty, or pardon or commutation of the sentence."
U.N. ESCOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 5, at 44, U.N. Doc. E11681 (1950).
75. Mr. Rodriguez Fabregat urged that "thou shalt not kill" must be the "su-
preme commandment for the conscience of mankind." Since the right to life was
"the very foundation of moral thought in Uruguay," it had abolished the death
penalty in 1905. U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 39th mtg. 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.139
(1950).
76. Id. at 91 28-29.
77. Id. at 91 37.
78. U.N. ESCOR, 6th Seass., 140th mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.140 (1950).
79. Egypt introduced an amendment to exempt "[olffenders under the age of
17," but withdrew it in light of discussion concerning varying ages for majority in
national laws and assurances that the amendments humane principle was already
implicitly reflected in the general terms of the article. U.N. ESCOR, 6th seas.,
149th mtg. It 68-92, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4ISR. 149 (1950); Draft International Conven-
tion on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.41384 (1950). The
issue resurfaced in debate during the Third Committee of the General Assembly in
1957. See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.820, infra note 85, 7.
Aside from Mr. Rodriguez Fabregat's statement concerning pregnant women,
the first concrete suggestion that pregnant women be exempted from the death
penalty came in comments by Yugoslavia on the Draft International Covenant on
Human Rights reported by the Seventh Session of the Commission in 1951, pro-
posing to add the following phrase, "In no case shall sentence of death be put into
effect when the sentence concerns a pregnant woman." U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess.,
Annex I, Agenda Item 16, at 92, U.N. Doc. E/1992 (1951). Yugoslavia's represen-
tative offered a revised version at the Commission's Eighth Session, U.N. ESCOR,
8th Sess., 311th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/SR.311 (1952).
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exists," recognizing abolition in many societies without commit-
ting retentionist states to immediate or even to gradual aboli-
tion.8"
The Commission completed its work on the right to life
article at its Eighth Session in 1952, where the abolitionist
view was revived by both Uruguay8' and Sweden.82 The
United Kingdom failed in its effort to substitute the minimalist
text of Article 2 of the European Convention for the
Commission's much-revised text.' Instead, the Commission
chose to retain the basic framework of a guarantee of the right
to life with a single explicit exception for the death penalty,
subject to certain limits. These limits were tightened by an
added reference to the Genocide Convention and the exemption
for pregnant women. The Commission's final draft of the right
to life article read:
1. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. Everyone's
right to life shall be protected by law.
2. In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence of
death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious
crimes pursuant to the sentence of a competent court and in
accordance with law not contrary to the principles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
3. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek
pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or
commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all
cases.
4. Sentence of death shall not be carried out on a pregnant
woman.
8 4
80. This phrase was added upon the suggestion of Rene Cassin of France, in
response to abolitionist views expressed by Mr. Pavlov of the USSR. U.N. ESCOR,
5th Sess., 93d mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. EICN.4ISR.93 (1949).
81. U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess, 310th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.310 (1952).
82. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.311, supra note 79, at 3.
83. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights and Measures of Imple.
mentation, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 4 59, U.N. Doc.
EION.41528/Add.1 (1952); U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 309th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.309 (1952).
84. U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 4, Annex I B, U.N. Doc. E/2256
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The Third Committee of the General Assembly took up, the
right to life article of the ICCPR in 1957, devoting thirteen
meetings to an exhaustive review of the varying approaches
adopted or rejected85 by the Commission, the lingering textual
uncertainties, and the further amendments to limit application
of the death penalty.88
A major focus throughout the debate was a proposal by
Uruguay and Colombia for immediate abolition: "Every human
being has the inherent right to life. The death penalty shall
not be imposed on any person."" The Uruguayan/Colombian
amendment, forcefully and eloquently presented by its spon-
sors,' had a large impact on shaping the debate. Although, in
(1952); U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., Annex I, Agenda Item 4, at 44, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/668 (1952).
85. For example, the Netherlands revived the proposal to adopt a right to life
provision identical to that in Article 2 of the European Convention. U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 12th Sess., 809th mtg. [ 24-26, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.809 (1957); U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 820th mtg. 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.820 (1957) [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.820] (Netherlands amendment defeated by vote of fifty in favor, nine
opposed, and eleven abstentions); U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., Agenda Item
35, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.651 (1957).
86. Among the further limits was the prohibition on the execution of persons
under the age of eighteen. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.820, supra note 85, at 291.
87. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., Agenda Item 33, at 1, U.N. Doe.
A/C.3/L.644 (1957) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.644].
88. Mr. Tejera of Uruguay, introducing the amendment, rejected the task set
by the Committee to agree on a formula of words limiting the death penalty in a
manner consistent with the Universal Declaration.
Although he was fully aware of the difficulties facing delegations
from countries where capital punishment existed, it seemed to him
anachronistic that in the twentieth century, at the current stage of moral
enlightenment, a United Nations Committee should be attempting to
define the cases in which it was lawful to kill a human being. Nothing
could justify capital punishment; most of the arguments brought forward
in its defence did not stand up to scrutiny. [Noting that many murderers
were mentally ill, that the death penalty was not a deterrent, that errors
led to executions of the innocent that could not be rectified]. The Uru-
guayan delegation therefore believed that instead of holding fruitless
discussions on the merit of a particular wording, it would be simpler to
discard the article and adopt the amendment ....
There was ... nothing in the Declaration to justify the existence
of capital punishment. Any penal code providing for capital punishment
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the end, only two somewhat equivocal references to the desir-
ability of eventual abolition were added to the text of Article
6,89 the Uruguayan and Colombian delegates could state with
a fair degree of accuracy that "[tihe death penalty was an
anachronism in the twentieth century and it was significant
that no one in the Committee had defended it."'
The most striking aspect of the debate over the Uruguay-
an/Colombian amendment and milder substitutes calling for
gradual abolition9' is the surprising source of opposition.
and any legal judgement imposing that sentence were [sic] ipso facto
contrary to the Universal Declaration.
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., 810th mtg. 11 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.810
(1957).
89. See infra notes 91, 100.
90. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., 811th mtg. 32, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.811 (1957) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.811] (comments of Mr. Tejera
of Uruguay). Mr. Zea Hernandez of Colombia stated that "[nlo one had defended
capital punishment in the course of the debate; at best, it had been deplored as a
necessary evil." U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., 812th mtg. 1 10, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.812 (1957) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.812]. He reiterated this obser-
vation at the end of the debate: "The concensus [sic] of opinion was that capital
punishment was an evil which, though still necessary in some countries, should
eventually be abolished." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.820, supra note 85, 28.
91. The French delegate made an oral proposal
to express the Committee's wish to abolish the death penalty by inserting
a provision to the effect that the States parties to the Covenant would
undertake to develop their penal legislation in such a way as progres-
sively to abolish capital punishment. Although the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights was to contain provisions which could be applied immedi-
ately, there was nothing against inserting provisions to be applied pro-
gressively. The solution might not be fully satisfactory, but he thought it
was the best way of taking the realities of the situation into consider-
ation.
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.811, supra note 90, 27.
Despite favorable reaction from many delegations, France offered no written
proposal of this sort. Instead, Panama proposed inserting the sentence, "The States
Parties to the Covenant recognize the propriety of promoting the abolition of the
death penalty." U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Seas., Agenda Item 33, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/L.653 (1957) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.653]; U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
12th Seas., 813th mtg. 1 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.813 (1957) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
AIC.3/SR.8131. The Irish delegate orally proffered a softer version intended to
make "clear that the Covenant could not be regarded as an instrument perpetuat-
ing the institution of capital punishment" but which would not involve an explicit
commitment to gradual abolition. Id. 41 ("Nothing in this article shall be in-
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States such as the United Kingdom,9 2 Belgium,9" New Zea-
land,9' Australia95 and Canada,96 which have all since be-
yoked to prevent or to retard any State Party to the Covenant from abolishing
capital punishment, either wholly or in part, by constitutional means.")
In light of two changes adopted by the Working Group, Panama withdrew
its proposal during discussions in a Working Party convened to reconcile the text
of Article 6. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., Agenda Item 33, 95, U.N. Doc.
A13764 (1957). The Working Party altered the text of Article 6(2) to read, "In
countries which have not abolished the death penalty ...." Id. 102. A variant
on the Irish proposal was added by the Working Party as a new paragraph,
"Nothing in this article shall be invoked to retard or to prevent any State Party
to the Covenant from abolishing capital punishment." Id. 1 105. A slightly revised
version proposed by Ceylon, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., 819th mtg. 1 31,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.819 (1957) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.819], was adopted
by the Committee.
92. Sir Samuel Hoare noted that capital punishment had recently been "hotly
debated" in the United Kingdom and that "with much travail" it had been greatly
restricted by Parliament. Thus, he felt he could not support the French suggestion
for a commitment to gradual abolition. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.811, supra note 90, 1
40. Mr. Tejera of Uruguay replied that the Parliamentary debates had revealed
that "capital punishment was opposed by a large body of public opinion in the
United Kingdom" and that the recent Parliamentary action symbolized progress,
indicating that "what some had called an ideal might become a reality sooner than
they thought." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.811, supra note 90, 41. Sir Samuel Hoare
later indicated that the United Kingdom's support for the Working Party's new
paragraph was "based on the Panamanian amendment." U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
12th Sess., 817th mtg. 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.817 (1957) [hereinafter U.N.- Doc.
A/C.3/SR.817].
93. Mr. Delhaye described the proposal as "too radical" and as potentially
"creating obstacles to accession." He noted that Belgium had not repealed its death
penalty, though it had not been carried out for seventy-five years. U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.813, supra note 91, 11 5, 6.
94. New Zealand could not support the Uruguayan/Colombian amendment "at
the current time" because it would "hinder the success of the Covenant." U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., 814th mtg. 46, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.814 (1957)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.814]. Mr. Small of New Zealand stiffly rejected the
view that "retention of the death penalty indicated a lack of social progress on
their part" However, he indicated his government's support for the paragraph
added by the Working Party to clarify that the Covenant should not retard aboli-
tion of capital punishment "in those countries which believed that to be the proper
course." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.817, supra note 92, 10.
95. Australia's delegate stated that he must oppose both the Uruguay-
an/Colombian amendment and a provision for gradual abolition because some Aus-
tralian states retained the death penalty. He stated, however, that Australia
"hoped that the need for capital punishment would ultimately disappear .
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.812, supra note 90, 1 24.
96. Canada noted that its Parliament had recently undertaken a review of the
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come abolitionist, raised the most categorical objections to the
Uruguayan/Colombian amendment. In contrast, Islamic states
which addressed the issue generally conceded the desirability
of eventual abolition. 7 For example, the delegate from Indo-
nesia "appreciated the lofty reasons that had prompted" the
Uruguayan/Colombian amendment, described abolition as "an
object to be sought by all States," and asserted that Indonesia
"earnestly... hoped that it would ultimately be attained."98
death penalty and had not taken any final decision on abolition. In light of that,
he stated that he could not support either the Uruguayan/Colombian amendment
(which was "unrealistic at the current time") or the French suggestion for a com-
mitment to gradual abolition. However, he indicated that Canada might be able to
support the milder Irish proposal (similar to the language actually adopted into
Article 6(6)). U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.814, supra note 94, 91I 35-37,
97. Mr. Osman of Morocco "sympathized with those who had so eloquently put
the case for the abolition of capital punishment ... and he hoped that the death
penalty would be eliminated in due course." He cautioned that the Uruguay-
an/Colombian amendment might be an "obstacle to ratification." U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.813, supra note 91, 91 21.
Mr. Rafik of Afghanistan "regretted that the Colombian-Uruguayan amend-
ment ... appeared to be impractical at the current time and he could only hope
that all States would abolish the death penalty in the near future." U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.814, supra note 94, 91 30.
Mr. Baroody of Saudi Arabia described the Uruguayan/Colombian amend-
ment as a "noble declaration of principle," but cautioned that "all countries were
not as fortunate as Uruguay and many of the Member States had not found it
possible to abolish capital punishment." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.811, supra note 90,
20.
Begum Jehan-Murshid of Pakistan did not indicate whether her delegation
could support gradual abolition, but did indicate that she could not vote for the
Uruguayan/Colombian amendment because Pakistan was retentionist. U.N. GAOR
3d Comm., 12th Sess., 818th mtg. 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.818 (1957).
Mr. Brillantes of the Philippines, which has a sizeable Muslim population,
stated that the "Philippine people shared the sentiments which had led Uruguay
and Colombia to plead for the prohibition of the death penalty." He urged, howev-
er, that abolition not be required in the Covenant since such a provision would
not be compatible with the laws of some states. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th
Sess., 815th mtg. 91 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.815 (1957).
98. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.812, supra note 90, a1 30. The Indonesian delegate op-
posed the amendment because it might deter ratification by retentionist states.
However, Indonesia could support the paragraph added by the Working Party
because it "did not bind States to abolish the death penalty immediately but rath-
er held out an ideal to aspire to." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.819, supra note 91, 1 49.
The United States did not address the substance of Article 6 because it had
decided not to ratify the Covenants and intended to abstain from voting and de-
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The debates over Article 6 in the Third Committee leave a
degree of uncertainty as to whether the article can fairly be
characterized as containing an implicit commitment to gradual
abolition." Had the Working Party not replaced a more ex-
plicit Panamanian proposal with what became the text of Arti-
cle 6(6),0 such a commitment would be clearer. However,
the Chairman of the Working Party indicated, without chal-
lenge, that the prefatory language in Article 6(2) ("[iln coun-
tries which have not abolished the death penalty .... ) 1
bate. U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.812, supra note 90, 17.
99. The vote on the Uruguayan/Colombian amendment was nine in favor, fifty-
one against, twelve abstentions. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.820, supra note 85, 1 7 (the
nine being Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Italy, Panama,
Uruguay and Venezuela). The vote on the final version of Article 6 was fifty-five
in favor, none opposed, and seventeen abstentions. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.820, supra
note 85, 1 27. As Landerer points out, the abstentions consisted mainly of the
Uruguayan/Colombian immediate abolition camp and the United Kingdom camp
favoring further explicit exceptions to the right to life along the model of Article
2(2) of the European Convention. See Landerer, supra note 24, at 529.
100. See supra note 91. The Panamanian proposal would have provided that
'[tihe States Parties to the Covenant recognize the propriety of promoting the
abolition of the death penalty." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.653, supra note 91. The eventual
text of Article 6(6) was much weakened: "Nothing in this article shall be invoked
to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to
the present Covenant." See supra note 16.
As the delegate from Panama stated:
The Working Party had suggested a new paragraph ... as a
substitute for the text submitted by the Panamanian delegation... ,
which the latter had agreed to withdraw. He still thought, nevertheless,
that the Panamanian amendment would have been more satisfactory, foi
its wording had been more positive, without, however, imposing any fur-
ther obligation on the signatory States than to recognize "the propriety of
promoting the abolition of the death penalty", the word "promoting" being
understood to mean the carrying out of studies with a view to the pro-
gressive abolition of capital punishment and the adoption of measures
gradually restricting its application .... He recalled that a number of
representatives had expressed their regret at the withdrawal of the Pana-
manian amendment; and in that regard he mentioned the suggestion
offered by the representative of El Salvador, who had referred to the
possibility of organizing a seminar to discuss the best means of securing
the abolition of the death penalty, as a procedure which would be in
accordance with the Panamanian amendment.
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.819, supra note 91, 1 24.
101. See supra note 16.
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was "intended to show the direction in which the drafters of
the Covenant hoped that the situation would develop,""0 2 pre-
sumably a reference to gradual worldwide abolition. It was far
from hyperbolic for the Colombian delegate to describe the
consensus of opinion in the Committee debates as being that
"capital punishment was an evil which, though still necessary
in some countries, should eventually be abolished.""3
Another significant development in the Third Committee
debates of 1957 was the suggestion by the Swedish delegate
that the UN undertake a "comparative study.., of the fre-
quency of crimes punishable by death in countries where the
death penalty had been abolished and in countries where it
was still in force" that "might be sufficiently thought-provoking
to produce a movement for reform in the countries which still
applied the death penalty."' This faith in the power of social
scientific data to overcome the political and cultural/symbolic
factors influencing retentionist states may have been mis-
placed, but General Assembly Resolution 1396 (XIV) of
19595 launched the UN's efforts to study "the question of
capital punishment, of the laws and practices relating thereto,
and of the effects of capital punishment, and the abolition
thereof, on the rate of criminality."'
The General Assembly debates over Resolution 1396 (XIV)
reveal a degree of discomfort with, though not adamant objec-
tion to, discussion of the death penalty as a human rights
102. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., 816th mtg. 1 19, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.816 (1957).
103. U.N. Doc. A'C.3ISR.820, supra note 85, 1 28.
104. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.813, supra note 91, 24. She suggested that the study
be undertaken by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities.
105. The co-sponsors of this proposal were Austria, Ceylon, Ecuador, Sweden,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and, in revised form, Italy. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 14th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/L.767 (1959), revised by U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/L.767/Rev.1 (1959) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.767]; U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 14th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.775 (1959)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.775]; U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 14th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 12, %J 54-62, 82, U.N. Doc. A/4250 (1959).
106. See supra note 9.
298 [Vol. XIX:2
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
issue, and with explicit UN commitment to abolition. This
discomfort is reflected in the vote on the resolution: forty-three
in favor, one opposed, and thirty abstentions. During the de-
bate, sponsors, such as Austria,"°7 reassured the Third Com-
mittee that the study would not constitute an interference in
internal affairs and would not necessarily lead to abolition.
Other supporters, including Italy"8 and Colombia,0 9 and
even some retentionist states such as Japan,"' favored the
study precisely because it would be the first step toward
worldwide abolition. Other retentionist states, such as
India," viewed the study as a way to assist states in form-
ing their own views on capital punishment, and not as a com-
mitment of all governments to abolition.
The most divisive issue concerned the proper body to su-
pervise the study, a debate that revealed reluctance in some
quarters to identify the death penalty as a human rights issue.
The original resolution" had invited the Economic and So-
cial Council (ECOSOC) to request the Commission on Human
Rights to undertake the study. After objection, this was re-
vised"' to provide that the study should be carried out by the
Commission on Human Rights "in consultation with the Social
Commission." Several states" argued that the issue of capi-
tal punishment was suitable only for the Social Commission,
but the resolution's supporters stressed the expertise that the
Commission on Human Rights had developed on capital pun-
ishment through drafting the Universal Declaration and the
107. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 14th Sess., 939th mtg. 22, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.939 (1959) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.9391.
108. Id. If 36-37.
109. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 14th Ses., 940th mtg. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.940 (1959) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.940].
110. U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.939, supra note 107, 25.
111. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.940, supra note 109, 13.
112. U.N. Doc. AIC.3/L.767, supra note 105.
113. U.N. Doc. AIC.3/L.767/Rev.1, supra note 105; U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.775, supra
note 105 (Italian amendment).
114. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.939, supra note 107, 91 30 (Philippines); U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.939, supra note 107, 31 (United Kingdom).
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ICCPR."5 A compromise left the question as to which body
should undertake the study to ECOSOC." 6
ECOSOC responded with Resolution 747 (XXIX) of 6 April
1960,117 which called upon the Secretary General to prepare a
"factual review of various aspects of the question of capital
punishment" in consultation with the ad hoc Advisory Commit-
tee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, thus tipping the scales toward the social defense
aspect of the issue. The study was undertaken by the Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, with Marc Ancel, a Jus-
tice of the French Supreme Court and Director of the Criminal
Science Section of the Institute of Comparative Law of Par-
is,"' as its author.
As Chairman of the European Committee on Crime Prob-
lems, Ancel had also been Rapporteur of a Council of Europe
report."' In preparing that survey, "[i]t was understood that
the question of the abolition or otherwise of the death penalty
was not to be examined as such.... ."2 ' Instead, the Council
of Europe survey presented comprehensive information on the
following: historical trends; existing capital crimes; trial, ap-
peal, and clemency procedures; modes of execution; crime sta-
tistics; and reform proposals.
115. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.940, supra note 109, 9 (remarks of delegate of
France), 22 (remarks of delegate of Sweden).
116. U.N. Doec. A/C.3/SR.940, supra note 109, % 23. The final text read:
The General Assembly
Invites the Economic and Social Council to initiate a study of the ques-
tion of capital punishment, of the laws and practices relating thereto,
and of the effects of capital punishment, and the abolition thereof, on the
rate of criminality.
This text was adopted by the Plenary Assembly by a vote of fifty-seven to none
with twenty-two abstentions. U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 841st plen. mtg. 74, U.N.
Doec. A/4286 (1959).
117. U.N. ESCOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/3373 (1960).
118. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 35, at 1.
119. M. MARC ANcEL, THE DEATH PENALTY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIEs (1962).
120. Id. at 3. However, the introduction also described capital punishment as
"a serious problem to which no upholder of individual freedom and human dignity
can be indifferent." Id. at 7.
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While leaving the human rights aspects of the death pen-
alty largely to implication, the Ancel reports were powerful
tools for abolitionism. The Death Penalty in European Coun-
tries noted that abolition tended to go through several stages:
reduction in the number of crimes punishable by death, intro-
duction of an alternate penalty, systematic commutation of
capital sentences, de facto abolition, followed finally by abo-
lition in law. 2' Deviations from this pattern might occur due
to extraordinary events. For instance, Italy had embraced
abolition in the Zanardelli Code of 1889, but Mussolini's fascist
regime had reintroduced it for ordinary crimes in 1930. In
1945 the death penalty was again abolished in revulsion
against the fascist period.' A similar repudiation of fascism
led to the abolition of the death penalty in Germany in 1949,
but without the earlier Italian experience of gradual abolition
in orderly steps.123 The Council of Europe report also de-
scribed how a series of notorious crimes, or, conversely, reve-
lations of miscarriages of justice, could cause a particular state
to deviate from the general pattern of gradual abolition. 2
The thrust of the report clearly supported the desirability and
inevitability of abolition:
An impartial glance at the facts clearly shows that the death
penalty is regarded in Europe as something of an anachro-
nism, surviving precariously for the moment but perhaps
doomed to disappear."=
The UN report took a somewhat more equivocal stance,
given the greater variety of practices and views among- the
121. Id. at 47.
122. Id. at 11, 14, 48. Austria had abolished the death penalty in 1919, but it
was reintroduced in 1934 under German domination. It was abolished again in
1945 (although operation of this provision was suspended until 1950). Id. at 11,
13.
123. Id. at 14, 48. The report notes that public opinion in Germany remained
strongly pro-death penalty and cautioned that its abolitionist status might be"frag-
ile. Id. at 53-54.
124. Id. at 50-51.
125. Id. at 55.
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states responding to the two questionnaires circulated by the
Secretary General. 6 For example, Ancel noted that although
there is a general trend to reduce the number of crimes pun-
ishable by death, recently in certain countries there had been
an extension of the death penalty to economic crimes or politi-
cal offenses.'27 Ancel concluded" that "among the leading
authorities in penal science, the supporters of abolition appre-
ciably outnumber those who favour the retention of capital
punishment," the latter being primarily "political figures" or
"jurists with a traditional training." 9 In his discussion of the
influence of religious views on the status of capital punish-
ment, Ancel described various abolitionist movements within
Christian sects, and did not mention Islam at all. 3 '
Ancel's report was reviewed by the ad hoc Advisory Com-
mittee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders.'' The Committee generally concurred in
Ancel's conclusions:
The Committee noted from Mr. Ancel's report, which matched
its own knowledge and experience, that if one looked at the
126. Sixty-nine states replied to the first questionnaire; a number of national
correspondents and non-governmental organizations in the field of prevention of
crime and treatment of offenders replied to the second questionnaire on the deter-
rent effect of the death penalty. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 35, at 1-4.
127. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 35, 100.
128. Almost apologetically, Ancel notes that "since the controversy has recently
been revived and has even become heated, the author felt that he could hardly
refrain from mentioning the arguments briefly in the present report." CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, supra note 35, 9 230.
129. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 35, 231.
130. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 35, 11 239-46:
131. The members of this body were the following: Murad bin Ahmad, Commis-
sioner of Prisons of Taiping; James V. Bennett, Director of the U.S. Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons; Torsten Eriksson, Director General of the National Swedish Pris-
ons Board; J. Carlos Garcid Basalo, Inspector General of Argentina's Penal Institu-
tions; Edward R. Moore, Assistant Attorney General of Liberia; A.W. Peterson,
Chairman of the U.K. Prison Commission; Hafez Abdel-Hadi Sabek, ex-President of
the United Arab Republic Supreme Court; and L.N. Smirnov, Chairman of the
Supreme Court of the USSR. Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the obser-
vations and recommendations of the ad hoc Advisory Committee of Experts on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. ESCOR, 35th Seas.,
Annexes, Agenda Item 11, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/3724 (1963).
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whole problem of capital punishment in a historical perspec-
tive it became clear that there was a world-wide tendency
towards a considerable reduction of the number and catego-
ries of offenses for which capital punishment might be im-
posed. This was of major importance in the assessment of
capital punishment policy."2
Observing that "modern studies of the deterrent effect of capi-
tal punishment are limited and inconclusive," ' the Commit-
tee recommended further sophisticated studies of deterrence,
especially in countries contemplating a change in death penal-
ty policies.'34 Noting Ancers data on de facto abolition, the
Committee urged governments to repeal death penalty statutes
"concerning any crime to which it is in fact not ap-
plied.... " 5 The Committee also suggested further reports
by governments on death penalty trends, and consideration of
new developments by the Consultative Group on the Preven-
tion of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. 3 '
ECOSOC adopted Resolution 934 (XXXV) of 9 April
1963,17 tracking the recommendations of the ad hoc Advisory
Committee. The Resolution's co-sponsor, Italy, urged
retentionist states to study the issue, with a view to eventual
abolition if possible.3 8 Retentionist states generally agreed
that more information on the subject would be valuable, and
regarded progress in limiting the scope of the death penalty as
132. Id.
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Committee also urged that governments provide complete medical
and social investigation of offenders liable to capital punishment and the "most
careful legal procedures and the greatest possible safeguards for the ac-
cused.. . ." Id.
137. E.S.C. Res. 934, U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5, U.N. Dec.
E/3753 (1963). Resolution 934 was adopted by a vote of sixteen in favor, none
opposed, and two abstentions. U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., 1251st mtg. Agenda Item
11, [ 13, U.N. Doc. E/SR.1251 (1963).
138. U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., 1249th mtg. Agenda Item 11, 6, U.N. Doc.
EISR.1249 (1963) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/SR.1249]. Austria and Italy co-sponsored
the Resolution. Id. 1 3.
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desirable.139 At the time, the United States was in one of its
greater abolitionist phases, and its delegate noted that
"[clapital punishment raised the moral issue of whether man,
organized into society, had the right to take the life of man as
an individual."40
When the General Assembly endorsed the recommenda-
tions of ECOSOC Resolution 934 (XXXV), it gave renewed
emphasis to the human rights aspects of the issue by asking
the Commission on Human Rights to study the Ancel report
and to make appropriate recommendations.' Yet, a supple-
mentary report prepared by expert consultant Norval Morris,
Capital Punishment: Developments 1961-1965,142 continued to
emphasize the social scientific aspects, with a special focus on
deterrence."4
139. See, e.g., remarks of the United States, id. [11 11-15; Yugoslavia, id. 1
16-19 (recommendations were practical and not philosophical and thus merited
support); Japan, id. [ 22-24; India, id. 27-28; Ethiopia, id. 91 29; Czechoslova-
kia, U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., 1250th mtg. Agenda Item 11, 1-4, U.N. Doc.
E/SR.1250 (1963).
140. U.N. Doc. E/SR.1249, supra note 138, 12. The United States delegate at-
tacked the extension of the death penalty to economic crimes by some states,
provoking a heated reply by the USSR delegate, who nevertheless supported the
resolution because it reflected "common ground in pursuing the general aim of the
limitation and eventual abolition of capital punishment." U.N. Doc. E/SR.1249,
supra note 138, 9 15, 35. The Ancel report noted that the USSR, having abol-
ished the death penalty in 1947, restored it in 1950 for traitors, spies and sabo-
teurs, and extended it in 1954 to premeditated murder and to a number of other
crimes between 1958 and 1961. CAPITAL PUNIsHMENT, supra note 35, at 32.
The most categorical retentionist position voiced in debates over ECOSOC
Res. 934 (XXXV) was that of the French delegate, who "felt, as a matter of princi-
ple, that the topic came within the exclusive competence of individual Member
States." U.N. Doc. E/SR.1249, supra note 138, 1 36.
141. G.A. Res. 1918 (XVIII), U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 12,
It 44-46, U.N. Doc. A15606 (1963).
142. NORVAL MORRs, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT PART II DEVELOPMENTS 1961-1965,
U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD/10, U.N. Sales No. E.67.IV.15 (1967).
143. Morris's study, though hampered by uneven data, was even more carefully
crafted than Ancel's. Morris concluded that:
all of the available data suggest that where the murder rate is increas-
ing, abolition does not appear to hasten the increase; where the rate is
decreasing, abolition does not appear to interrupt the decrease; where the
rate is stable, the presence of or absence of capital punishment does not
appear to affect it.
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When the Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders reviewed the data at its Au-
gust 1968 session, heightened attention was given to the hu-
man rights aspects of the debate. The pro-abolition views that
are only implicit in the Ancel and Morris reports became ex-
plicit:
The capital punishment argument has changed. No
member of the Consultative Group supported capital punish-
ment other than as a temporary expedient or until the public
should come to see the lack of need for this [sanction]. All
looked with favour towards the day of abolition. Capital pun-
ishment thus becomes an "exceptional" not a routine sanc-
tion, which should be used sparingly as social circumstances
permit, so that the provisions of Article 3 of the Declaration
of Human Rights may be implemented. Such a statement is
not an interference with national autonomy, it simply recog-
nizes that the burden of proof in relation to the need for
capital punishment for any type of crime and for the execu-
tion of any individual criminal has shifted with the progress
of social understanding and a larger recognition of the rights
of man.'"
The Consultative Group endorsed meaningful appeal rights45
and information from member states to the Secretary General
concerning "their present attitude-with indication of the rea-
sons therefor-to possible further restriction of the use of the
death penalty or to its total abolition .... "146 The Consulta-
Id. at 82. While trends were mixed in the period under review, Morris found a
continuation of the long-term trend toward abolition. Id. at 81-82. "[The categories
of offences from which the death penalty was removed are those, particularly ho-
micide, to which it has traditionally been applied; whereas the categories for which
it was newly invoked are economic and political crimes that are seen as involving
a threat to social order or governmental stability." Id. at 85.
144. UNITED NATIONS CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND
THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Annex, 1 15, U.N. Doc.
A/7243 (1968) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/7243].
145. Id. 6. The Consultative Group also emphasized access to competent
counsel. Id. 17-19. E.S.C. Res. 1337 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968 also included these
recommendations. U.N. Doc. A/7243, Annex, supra note 144, 6.
146. U.N. Doc. A/7243, supra note 144, 6.
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five Group did not regard further studies of deterrence to be of
great value47 to "expedite the trend towards the abolition of
capital punishment... 14 s The Consultative Group recom-
mended that states collating data on their capital sentencing
practices supply it to the Secretary General for dissemina-
tion.149
The Third Committee of the General Assembly took up the
issue at its Twenty-third Session in 1968, coincidentally the
International Year for Human Rights. 50 Noting the conclu-
sions of the Ancel, Morris, and Consultative Group reports of a
worldwide trend toward abolition, the Third Committee, "[de-
siring] to promote further the dignity of man and thus to con-
tribute to the International Year for Human Rights,"15 en-
dorsed the recommendations of meaningful rights to appeal
and competent counsel, and it called upon member states to
report their attitude and plans for further restriction or total
abolition of the death penalty.'52 General Assembly Resolu-
tion 2393 (XXII) marks the commencement of the periodic
reports on capital punishment by the Secretary General that
'were to serve as the focus of continued UN attention to the
issue.'53 Most strikingly, the pre-ambular paragraphs of Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 2393 (XXIII) link the issue of capital
punishment both to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration
concerning the right to life, and also to Article 5 concerning
torture."54 Yet, little was ultimately to be made of this per-
147. See U.N. Doc., A/7243, supra note 144, 30.
148. U.N. Doc. A/7243, supra note 144, 30.
149. U.N. Doc. A/7243, supra note 144, 31.
150. See UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
PROCLAMATION OF TEHRAN, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, U.N. Sales No.
E.68XIV.2 (1968).
151. G.A. Res. 2393 (XXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 42, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1968).
152. Id."
153. The resolution calls upon states to inform the Secretary General of actions
they take to comply with the resolution, and calls upon the Secretary General to
report to ECOSOC in 1971. Id.
154. Id.; Landerer, supra note 24, at 533.
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ception of capital punishment as a form of torture in UN con-
sideration of the subject.
The debates leading to the adoption of General Assembly
Resolution 2393 (XXIII) reveal a general, though not universal,
commitment to the abolitionist goal.'55 Many retentionist
countries participating in the debate conceded the desirability
of abolition.' The United States, still at an historical high
water mark for abolitionist sentiment, regarded the resolution
as an important step toward abolition and stated that there
was no justification for the death penalty. 5'
However, the lopsided vote of ninety in favor, with none
opposed, and three abstentions 58 is due, in large measure, to
the modest nature of General Assembly Resolution 2393
(XXIII), which emphasized procedural rights in capital cases
rather than abolition per se. A number of abolitionist states re-
gretted this caution, asserting that the conclusions of the Ancel
and Morris reports and the recommendations of the Consulta-
tive Group justified much more rapid progress toward aboli-
tion.159
155. China (Taiwan) supported the draft but felt capital punishment was a
complex issue related to social and political traditions in various countries..U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1557th mtg. 1 17, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1557 (1968)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1557]. Morocco questioned whether humanitarian
attitudes were appropriate with respect to persons committing monstrous crimes,
but supported the draft. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1558th mtg. 9 41, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.1558 (1968) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3ISR.1558].
156. See, e.g., Remarks of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.1558, supra note 155,
1; France, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1558, supra note 155, 9; Chile, U.N. Doc.
AIC.3/SR.1558, supra note 155, 16; the Philippines, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1558,
supra note 155, 1 36; Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1558, supra note 155, % 37;
Canada, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1559th mtg. 1 2, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1559 (1968); Syria, id. 1 16; Israel, id. 1 25. Upper Volta, however; suc-
cessfully urged deletion of the request for states to indicate the reasons for their
retention or abolition of the death penalty, on grounds that this placed retentionist
states on the defensive. See Capital Punishment: Upper Volta: Amendment to the
Draft Resolution Contained in Document A17243, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d
Sess., Agenda Item 59, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1555 (1968).
157. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1557, supra note 155, 20.
158. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1557, supra note 155, 1 34.
159. See, e.g., Remarks of Italy, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1557, supra note 155, 1 11;
Portugal, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1557, supra note 155, 18; Austria, U.N. Doc.
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While the strategy of urging safeguards promotes human
rights objectives by reducing capricious application of the
death penalty, it also risks blunting the impetus toward aboli-
tion by permitting retentionist states to seek shelter from
human rights criticism through claims that their procedural
systems are above reproach."6 The focus thus strays from the
central question of whether human rights are violated whenev-
er persons are executed.
IV. THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Despite the strong Latin American abolitionist tradition,
political realities prevented the adoption of a prohibition on
the death penalty in the American Convention on Human
Rights. A Uruguayan amendment to Article 4 of the American
Convention providing that "[n]o one shall be sentenced to
death,"'' failed on a vote of eight in favor, none opposed, and
eleven abstentions. 62 Undaunted, the pro-abolition forces at
the Conference of San Jos pronounced a declaration that
foreshadowed the adoption, twenty-one years later, of a proto-
col for the abolition of the death penalty:
The undersigned Delegations . . . , in response to the
majority sentiment expressed in the course of the debates on
the prohibition of the death penalty, in agreement with the
AIC.3/SR.1558, supra note 155, 1 2.
160. A number of retentionist states participating in the debate on G.A. Res.
2393 (XXIII) asserted that their systems provided safeguards consistent with the
resolution. See, e.g., Remarks of delegate of the United Arab Republic, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1558, supra note 155, 22; Pakistan, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.1558, supra
note 155, 24.
161. HuMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 248 (Thomas Buergenthal &
Robert Norris eds., 1982) (amendment proposed at Second Plenary Session of the
Conference of San Jos6, Nov. 20, 1969, Doc. 86, Corr. 1 (1970)) [hereinafter
Buergenthal & Norris].
162. Voting in favor were Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Argentina,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. Abstaining were El Salvador, Trinidad and
Tobago, United States, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Gua-
temala, Nicaragua, and Peru. Id. Costa Rica abstained on the vote on Article 4 as
a whole because of its abolitionist tradition. Id. at 248-49.
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most pure humanistic traditions of our peoples, solemnly
declare our firm hope of seeing the application of the death
penalty eradicated from the American environment as of the
present and our unwaivering [sic] goal of making all possible
efforts so that, in a short time, an additional protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights-Pact of San Jos6,
Costa Rica-may consecrate the final abolition of the death
penalty and place America once again in the vanguard of the
defense of the fundamental rights of man."
Article 4 embodies several real advances in the restriction
of the death penalty despite its concessions to retentionist
realities. As early as 1959, the Inter-American Council of Ju-
rists had prepared a draft convention whose right to life article
tracked that of the draft UN covenant,' with the addition of
a bar on capital punishment for political offenses." 5 In 1965,
163. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note 161, at 270 (Summary Minutes of Clos-
ing Plenary Session, Nov. 22, 1969, Doc. 84 (1969)). The sponsoring delegations
were Costa Rica, Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Honduras,
the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Argentina, and
Paraguay.
164. See supra note 99.
165. Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos, OAS Doc. OEAISer.E/XI.1 Doc. 8 corr.
at 2 (1964) (transmitting draft human rights convention to the OAS Council). The
text of the drafts Article 2 read (translated from Spanish):
1. The right to life is inherent in the human person. This right shall be
protected by law from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries where capital punishment has not been abolished, sen-
tence of death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious
crimes and pursuant to the final judgment of a competent court, and in
accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the
commission of the crime.
3. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses.
4. Capital punishment shall not be imposed on persons who, at the time
the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age; nor shall it be
applied to pregnant women.
The exception for political offenses caused difficulty based on concerns by
states such as Brazil and the United States that political offenses could not be
precisely defined. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note 161, at 90-91, 152. A proposal
by El Salvador to define them in the text failed. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note
161, at 37. The solution, also proposed by El Salvador, was to keep the text of
Article 4(4), and to ask the Conference to adopt a resolution asking the Council of
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Uruguay made the intriguing suggestion that the convention
prohibit the death penalty, but permit states to enter limited
reservations to this provision.66 This proposal was not adopt-
ed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) when it submitted a draft convention to the Council
of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1968,167
which became the basis for discussions at the Conference of
San Jos6. But the IACHR draft limited the death penalty to
the most serious crimes under law adopted prior to the crime,
barred capital punishment for political offenses, excluded per-
sons under eighteen or over seventy68 and pregnant women
from the death penalty, and guaranteed condemned prisoners
the right to apply for pardon or commutation or to receive amnesty.c
the OAS to request the Inter-American Juridical Committee to update its 1959
study of the concept of political offenses. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note 161, at
41-42.
166. Uruguay's proposed Article 2(2), submitted to the Second Special Inter-
American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in May and June 1965, provided:
The States Parties to this Convention shall abolish capital punishment.
Reservations to this provision shall be admitted solely on condition that
sentence of death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious
crimes and pursuant to the final judgment of an independent and impar-
tial regular court, which will satisfy due process of law, and in accor-
dance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the
commission of the crime.
Draft Convention on Human Rights, OAS Doe. OEA/Ser.FXIII.1 Doc. 49, at 1
(1965).
167. The IACHR had indicated approval of Uruguay's approach during its pre-
liminary consideration of the draft convention. See OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.15
Doc. 29, at 25 (1966); OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G/IV C-i-787 Rev. 3, at 88 (1967).
168. The over 70 age limit is also reflected in Article 44 of the Guatemalan
Penal Code and in Article 54 of the 1966 Constitution, as noted in a 1966 study
of the death penalty prepared by IACHR member Angela Acuna de Chacon. El
Derecho a la Vida, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.I/V/II.15 Doc. 13, at 27-28 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter Angela Acuna de Chacon].
169. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note 161, at 2-3 (1982) (Draft Inter-American
Convention on Protection of Human Rights (IACHR), adopted as a working docu-
ment by the Council of the OAS on October 2, 1968). Article 3 of the IACHR draft
read:
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right
shall be protected by law, in general, from the moment of conception. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
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Commenting on the IACHR draft, Uruguay expressed
regret for the "unavoidable compromises" underlying the draft
and noted that "there does not seem to be a climate of opinion
favoring the elimination of the death penalty.... .1 o Howev-
er, Uruguay proposed the interim solution of adding the follow-
ing provision:
The death penalty shall not be established in states that
have abolished it, nor shall its application be extended to
crimes with respect to which it does not presently apply.171
This provision gave concrete shape to the gradual trend toward
abolition 2 by attempting to forestall the two phenomena
running contrary to that trend-instances of abolitionist coun-
tries reversing direction' and expansion to new crimes by
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sen-
tence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court, and in
accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the
commission of the crime.
3. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political
offenses.
4. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at
the time the crime was committed, were inder 18 years of age or over
70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant women.
5. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply
for pardon or commutation of sentence. Amnesty, pardon, or commutation
of capital punishment may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment
shall not be imposed while a decision is pending on the first application
for commutation, presented to the competent authority.
The IACHR explained that it chose not to adopt Uruguay's proposed paragraph 2
for the sake of similarity to Article 6(2) of the ICCPR. Buergenthal & Norris,
supra note 161, at 36 (Annotations on the Draft IACHR, prepared by its Secretar-
iat).
170. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note 161, at 205 (Uruguay's Observations Re-
garding the Draft IACHR, dated December 27, 1968).
171. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note 161, at 205. With minor textual chang-
es, this proposal was added to the draft article in the Second Session of Commit-
tee I at the Conference of San Jos6. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note 161, at 32-
33.
172. Acuna de Chacon's 1966 study on the death penalty in the Americas noted
the trend toward abolition. See supra note 168, at 13.
173. Morris noted in the study period from 1961-65 that, among jurisdictions
replying to his questionnaires only Delaware of the United States had restored the
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retentionist states.174 The commitment to eventual abolition
was so strong at the Conference of San Jos6 that the United
States even argued that the exemptions for minors, the elderly,
and pregnant women should be deleted because they clashed
with "the general trend, already apparent, for the gradual
abolition of the death penalty."'75
V. A VISIBLE UNITED NATIONS COMMITMENT TO THE GOAL OF
ABOLITION
With the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2857
(XXVI) of 20 December 1971, the UN General Assembly ex-
plicitly committed the organization to the "main objective...
of progressively restricting the number of offenses for which
capital punishment may be imposed, with a view to the desir-
ability of abolishing this punishment in all countries ... .,17
Yet, the Third Committee debates on this resolution were brief
and anticlimactic. Oddly, the ire of retentionist states was
directed toward language that merely restated passages from
the almost unanimously adopted General Assembly Resolution
2393 (XXIII),"' expressed "the desirability of continuing and
death penalty after three years of abolition. MORRIS, supra note 142, at 6. Argenti-
na, abolitionist since 1921, restored the death penalty in March 1971 and abol-
ished it (except for exceptional crimes in the military penal code) again in Decem-
ber 1972. Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 54th
Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 73, U.N. Doe. E/5242/Add.1 (1973). Argentina again
restored the death penalty in 1974. Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 6, 25, U.N. Doc. E11980/9 (1980).
The death penalty was abolished for ordinary crimes in 1984 with the restoration
of civilian government. HOOD, supra note 8, at 27. Argentina did not ratify the
American Convention on Human Rights until September 1984. Annual Report of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doe. OEAJSer.LIV/II.81
Rev.1 Doc. 6 Annex A (1992).
174. Morris noted that during the 1961-65 period these tended to be economic
and political crimes. See supra note 142, at 7.
175. Buergenthal & Norris, supra note 161, at 152 (Observations and Proposed
Amendments to the Draft IACHR, submitted by the United States on July 2,
1969).
176. G.A. Res. 2857 (XXVI), supra note 2.
177. Separate votes were held on the words: "or its total abolition7 in. pre-
ambular paragraph 1 and operative paragraph 4, even though these were merely
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extending the consideration of the question of capital punish-
ment by the UN, "l or called for a special report by the Sec-
retary General on provisions for pardon, reprieve or commuta-
tion in retentionist states. 9 No amendments were proposed
to operative paragraph 3 nor was a separate vote held on it,
despite its call for progressive abolition and its linkage of abo-
lition to the full guarantee of the right to life.'
General Assembly Resolution 2857 (XXVI) represented a
small but concrete step toward abolition to its sponsors, but
they reassured retentionist states that the commitment was
one of only gradual abolition.'8' Such assurances did not gar-
ner the support of abstaining states citing concerns such as the
instability of developing countries,'82 the need to restore the
death penalty to combat terrorists,18 or the inconclusiveness
of internal debates on abolition.'
references to G.A. Res. 2393 (XXIII). The language was retained by votes of twen-
ty-four in favor, eight opposed, and sixty-one abstentions and twenty-three in fa-
vor, nine opposed, and sixty-two abstentions, respectively, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
26th Sess., 1905th mtg. 69, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1905 (1971) [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.1905], even though GA. Res. 2393 (II) had been adopted, only
three years earlier, by a vote of eighty-seven in favor, one opposed, and seven
abstentions. See supra note 151.
178. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1905, supra note 177, 42. This pre-ambular para-
graph was retained by a vote of thirty-one in favor, four opposed, and fifty-eight
in abstentions. U.N. Doc. AIC.31SR.1905, supra note 177, 69.
179. Operative paragraph 6 was retained by a vote of thirty-three in favor,
none opposed, and sixty-two abstentions. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1905, supra note 177,
69.
180. Yet its significance was noted by Landerer, supra note 24, at 534 n.101.
When the similar language of ECOSOC Res. 1574 (L) was quoted in the 1973
report of the Secretary General on capital punishment, it was underscored to em-
phasize its perceived significance in committing the United Nations to a program
for abolition. Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR,
54th Sess., Agenda Item 13, 5, U.N. Doc. E/5242 (1973) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
E/5242].
181. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1905, supra note 177, 41-44, 47, 53 (Sweden); 51
(Italy).
182. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1905, supra note 177, 61 (Senegal).
183. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1905, supra note 177, If 65-67 (Brazil). In 1942 Brazil
had abolished capital punishment, aside from military courts. Angela Acuna de
Chacon, supra note 168, at 16. It was restored in 1969 for crimes against the
state causing loss of life. U.N. Doc. E/5242, supra note 180, 36.
184. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1905, supra note 177, 46 (United States, iioting
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Cautionary notes were strongly sounded in the Secretary
General's 1973 report 85 which indicated the fragile nature of
the consensus on abolition. The report included observations
that the UN, after its examination of "practical issues" such as
deterrence, had "gradually shifted from the position of a neu-
tral observer concerned about, but not committed on the issue
of capital punishment, to a position favouring the eventual
abolition of the death penalty."85
Suggesting doubt about the strength of this commitment,
the report noted that "[flor every State Member of the United
Nations devoted to the abolition of capital punishment in law
or fact there would appear to be three others legally committed
to its sanction and use-at least as a very last resort."
187
Criticizing earlier studies for undue reliance on Western
data," the report found it "extremely doubtful whether there
is any uniform progression towards the restriction of the use of
the death penalty; progress is discernible only in the very long
run and it is usually marked by many ups and downs."189 The
planned study by Department of Justice Task Force and pending litigation in the
Supreme Court).
185. U.N. Doc. E/5242, supra note 180, 73, written pursuant to G.A., Res.
3011 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, which called for an updating of the 1962 and
1967 reports. U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 28A, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/8928
(1972).
186. U.N. Doc. E/5242, supra note 180, 16. The report also notes that "[t]he
States Members of the United Nations have decided that abolition must be the
right direction for human society to take though they do not say when." U.N. Doc.
H/5242, supra note 180, 77.
187. U.N. Doc. E15242, supra note 180, 13.
188. No particular studies are identified, and the target of criticism appears to
be intellectuals in general:
The result has been a rather misleading picture which has frequently
given an unwarranted universality to values, theories or practices preva-
lent in the west. In academic circles it has sometimes become unfashion-
able to support capital punishment: civilization is tolerance and severity
in punishment a sign of backwardness and regression, and so liberal
thinking and the abolition of the death penalty are expected to coincide.
U.N. Doc. E15242, supra note 180, 23.
189. U.N. Doc. E15242, supra note 180, 5 24. The report notes the extension of
capital punishment in some states to new crimes such as hijacking and drug traf-
ficking. U.N. Doc. E/5242, supra note 180, 11 27, 74.
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report questioned the utility of promoting the abolitionist goal
by social science studies, noting that the death penalty is still
regarded by some governments as an efficient or acceptable
means "of getting rid of certain types of problems-whatever
the experts may have to say about the lack of deterrent effect
of this penalty."190 The gloomy tone of the report is especially
striking given that the developments noted since 1967 included
abolition or further restriction in eight countries, reintroduc-
tion in two (Argentina and Brazil), a five-year moratorium in
Canada, and the Furman decision of the United States Su-
preme Court 9 ' striking down. the death penalty laws of all
the states. 92
ECOSOC responded with Resolution 1745 (LIV) of 16 May
1973, which called upon the Secretary General to provide ana-
lytical reports on capital punishment at five-year intervals
beginning in 1975,' "believing that scientifically based stud-
ies are needed to improve knowledge and understanding of the
death penalty and to define what further work could be done
by the United Nations in this field ..... ' The involvement
of the social defense arm of the UN was also stressed in the re-
quest that the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control
examine the Secretary General's 1973 report and "the issues
presently involved in the question of capital punishment."95
The sense of stagnation in the progress toward abolition,
reflected in the 1973 and 1975 reports of the Secretary Gener-
al, was noted "with concern" by the General Assembly in Reso-
lution 32/61 of 8 December 1977,196 which also reiterated the
190. U.N. Doc. E/5242, supra note 180, % 28.
191. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
192. Id.; see also U.N. Doc. E/5242, supra note 180, % 36.
193. U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/5367 (1973)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/5367]. The first brief report noted mixed trends of aboli-
tion and further restriction of the death penalty, versus increasing executions in
states such as the Philippines. Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., at 21-48, U.N. Doc. E/5616 (1975) [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. E/5616].
194. U.N. Doc. E/5367, supra note 193.
195. U.N. Doc. E/5367, supra note 193.
196. U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977)
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"main objective" of progressive restriction and gradual aboli-
tion. The General Assembly expressed regret at the low num-
ber of responses to the Secretary General's questionnaire on
capital punishment,"9 and called upon the Sixth UN Con-
gress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers to prepare documentation and discuss the use of the death
penalty and access to pardon, commutation or reprieve.9 ' Fi-
nally, the General Assembly decided to consider "With high
priority" the issue of capital punishment at its thirty-fifth
session in 1980.'99
The Secretary General's 1980 report.0 noted a similar
mixture of developments as had the 1975 report, finding the
"legal status of capital punishment... relatively unchanged"
over the reporting period.201 Noting the *"erratic" pattern of
increases and decreases in actual imposition of the death pen-
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/32/45].
197. Only 32 states had responded. Id. The General Assembly also urged the
Secretary General to complete the study of pardon, commutation and reprieve
(requested in 1971) in the context of preparing the 1980 report. Id.
198. U.N. Doc. A/32/45, supra note 196, 4-5. The Committee on Crime Pre-
vention and Control in 1978 decided to discuss capital punishment in conjunction
*with norms and guidelines on criminal justice and to place the issue on the agen-
da of the Sixth Crime Congress. U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc.
EICN.5/558 (1978).
199. U.N. Doc. A/32/45, supra note 196, 1 6. G.A. Res. 32/61 was adopted by
consensus. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 32d Sess., 49th mtg. 35, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/32/SR.49 (1977).
200. Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 17, U.N. Doc. E11980/9 and Corr.1, Add.1, Add.I/Corr.1,
Add.2, Add.3, Corr.2 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E1980/9]. The 1980 report final-
ly provides the study of systems of pardon, commutation and reprieve called for in
G.A. Res. 2857 (XXVI), finding that in states responding to the Secretary General
questionnaire "about two thirds of the convicts sentenced to death ... were even-
tually reprieved." Id. 57. The report notes that this pattern raises "the issue of
equal treatment," but in some countries may be "indicative of a trend towards the
de facto abolition of capital punishment and, eventually, towards an abolitionist
tradition." Id. 58.
E.S.C. Res. 1979/22 of 9 May 1979 expressed concern about the slow prog-
ress in restricting the number of capital offenses and reiterated the aim of eventu-
al abolition. E.S.C. Res. 1979/22, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 17
(1979).
201. U.N. Doc. E/1980/9, supra note 200, J 19.
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alty,2 the report concludes that the data do "not indicate
any major progress towards change in policy with regard to the
restriction or abolition of the death penalty."2"' Though less
caustic in tone than the 1975 report, the 1980 report suggested
that the UN must make "[flurther efforts... to pursue its
declared principal objective in this area-the ultimate total
abolition of the death penalty in all countries."
204
Perhaps most significantly, the 1980 report introduced a
note of concern about extrajudicial executions 'hich are in-
creasing in certain countries, retentionist and abolitionist
alike."0 5 The phenomena of disappearances and extrajudicial
executions were to preoccupy UN bodies over the next decade,
diverting attention from the traditional debates over capital
punishment and possibly contributing to the stall in progress
toward abolition.
VI. CONCERN WITH SUMMARY AND ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS
In the early 1980s, international attention increasingly
focused on the phenomenon of disappearances and the often
related practice of extrajudicial execution.0 6 Concern for
these gross violations of human rights, though obviously justi-
202. U.N. Doc. E/1980/9, supra note 200, 35.
203. U.N. Doc. E/1980/9, supra note 200, 82.
204. U.N. Doc. E11980/9, supra note 200, 85.
205. U.N. Doc. E/1980/9, supra note 200, 84. The report noted that the num-
ber of de facto executions probably exceeded the reported judicial executions during
the relevant period. U.N. Doc. E/1980/9, supra note 200, 84.
206. As Roger Hood noted in his study:
Despite the fact that all countries, when replying to the United
Nations, both deny and condemn such practices, it is well known that
such executions have occurred in a substantial number of such countries,
often on a large scale and out of all proportion to executions carried out
under the due process of law. It has happened in those which have for-
mally abolished the death penalty as well as in those which retain it.
[citation omitted].
HOOD, supra note 8, at 7.
See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, DISAPPEARANCES: A WORKBOOK
(1981); LAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DmTY WAR
AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNrrED NATIONS (1990).
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fled and compelling, had the effect of dampening the impetus
toward the abolition of the judicial death penalty as a matter
of high priority for the UN."0 7 Although the Sixth UN Con-
gress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders
responded to General Assembly Resolution 32/61 by placing
the issue of capital punishment on its agenda,"' the Con-
207. Under GA. Res. 32/61 of 1977, further restriction and eventual abolition
of the death penalty were to be matters of high priority at the Thirty-fifth Session
of the General Assembly in 1980. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
208. SIxTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIIE AND
TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
E.81.IV.4 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14fRev.1]. The Sixth Crime
Congress received a working paper from the Secretary General describing the
United Nation's previous work on the death penalty. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, supra. The report noted a symposium on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in the Arab Homeland, held in Baghdad in May 1979, at
which "a strong position against the death penalty was expressed." U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 34th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/34/11 (1979). The Secre-
tary General's working paper suggested two possible approaches toward gradual
abolition: that taken by some common law countries in appointing high-level fact-
finding commissions and imposing a formal moratorium to assess the effects and
pave the way to de jure abolition, or in increasing use of pardons and amnesty to
achieve abolition de facto which may lead to "a firmly established abolitionist
tradition." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, supra, 83-91.
At the European Regional Preparatory Meeting, "a number of participants
strongly supported the inclusion of the question of capital punishment, although
there was some contrary opinion . . . . It would therefore be appropriate for the
Congress to explore the possibilities of further restricting the use of the death
penalty and of elaborating safeguards against its abuse. It was also pointed out,
however, that progress in this direction might be difficult because of differences in
cultures and moral values." UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT ON THE
EUROPEAN REGIONAL PREPARATORY MEETING ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND
THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, 53, U.N. Doc. AICONF.87IBP/I1, U.N. Sales No.
E.81.V.4 (1978). At the African Regional Preparatory Meeting, "[t]he participants
declared their agreement with the stated policy . . . which envisaged the eventual
abolition of all capital punishment. But difficulties had to be anticipated on that
road .... Agreement was expressed that all penal codes needed urgent review as
to whether ... its use could not be restricted to progressively fewer offenses, with
a view toward ultimate abolition." UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT
ON THE AFRICAN REGIONAL PREPARATORY MEETING ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME
AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/BP/4, U.N. Sales
No. E.81.IV.4 (1979). At the Asian and Latin American preparatory meetings,
specific notice of the phenomenon of disappearances and extra-judicial executions
was taken, along with invocation of the U.N. commitment to eventual abolition.
UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC PREPA-
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gress took no action on an innovative proposal by Austria,
Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden calling
on retentionist states to impose a moratorium on the imposi-
tion of the *death penalty."9 Given the divisiveness of the
moratorium proposal, the Sixth Crime Congress found it politi-
cally far easier to deplore extrajudicial executions as a "par-
ticularly abhorrent crime, the eradication of which is a high
international priority.... .2 1 0
The fate of the moratorium proposal at the Sixth Crime
Congress is symptomatic of the stall in progress in the UN's
abolitionist agenda that characterized the 1980s. With pre-
ambular language citing both the right to life and torture arti-
cles of the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR,21' -and
questioning the deterrent value of the death penalty,212 the
four-nation moratorium proposal expressed the hope that the
death penalty would not be re-established by abolitionist
states, extended to new categories of crimes by retentionist
states,213 nor applied by retentionist states while they "study
the effects of abolition on a provisional basis .... 214 Basic
disagreement on the premises of the moratorium proposal,
manifested especially by Egypt's introduction of a contrary
RATORY MEETING, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/BP12, U.N. Sales No. E.81.IV.4
(1978).
209. United Nations Rules and Guidelines In Criminal Justice From Standard
Setting To Implementation, And Capital Punishment, Sixth United Nations Con-
gress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Comm. I, Agenda
Item 7, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/C.1/L.1 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.87/C.I/L.1].
210. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14Rev.1, supra note 208, at 9 (Resolution 5).
211. Draft resolution, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, supra note 208, pre-
ambular 1-2.
212. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14fRev.1, supra note 208, 5-6, reads:
Being aware that the evidence on the deterrent effect of capital
punishment is inconclusive,
Noting that it has not been established that the total abolition of
the death penalty has led to negative consequences in the field of crimi-
nal policy ....
213. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14Rev.1, supra note 208, 4.
214. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, supra note 208, 5.
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resolution that asserted the continued value of the death pen-
alty as a general deterrent,215 blocked abolitionist progress at
the Sixth Crime Congress. The four sponsors withdrew the
resolution "[r]ealizing that there was inadequate time for the
completion of work on the question" and with the assurance
that the proposal would be appended to the report of the Sixth
Congress to the General Assembly.
216
Undaunted by their failure at the Sixth Crime Congress,
the sponsors.. of the moratorium proposal renewed their ef-
forts at the Thirty-fifth Session of the General Assembly, only
to meet further procedural roadblocks.1 8 The Third Commit-
215. The pre-ambular paragraphs referred to "the importance of general deter-
rence" and the need to "instil [sic] the necessary fear in the hearts of people to
prevent them from committing certain serious crimes. .. ." Amendment proposed
by Egypt, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, supra note 208, at 60-61.
216. According to Manuel Lopez-Rey, Chairman of the United Nations Commit-
tee on Crime Prevention and Control, the debate on the four nation proposal:
was a good example of international ambivalence. Many countries ex-
pressed their deepest sympathy for abolition, but at the same time re-
garded capital punishment as necessary for the protection of what they
called the state. More specifically the representatives of Nigeria, Sudan,
several Arab countries, the Popular Democratic Republic of Yemen, India,
Japan, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the USSR also expressed their sym-
pathy, but insisted on the necessity of maintaining capital punishment at
least 'temporarily.' Most of the Latin American countries remained silent,
the most significant exceptions being Ecuador and Mexico which were
openly in favour of abolition. The Caracas Declaration [final document of
the Sixth Congress] does not contain any reference to the gradual aboli-
tion of capital punishment, the impression being that it would not have
been adopted if the reference had been made ....
The draft resolution submitted by Ecuador, the Federal Republic of
Germany and Sweden asking for abolition was eventually withdrawn in
view of the overwhelming combination of comments concerning 'sympathy'
and 'necessity'; the representative of Egypt played a leading role in de-
feating it. In sum, in spite of the numerous requests of the General
Assembly, ECOSOC, abolitionist countries and the Secretariat, no action
was taken.
MANUEL LOPEZ-REY, A GUIDE TO UNITED NATIONS CRmINAL POLICY 111 (A.E. Bot-
toms ed., 1985) (citations omitted).
217. Sweden took the lead, with co-sponsors Austria, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Portugal,
Spain, Venezuela, Italy and Norway. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 35th Sess., Agenda
Item 65, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/L.67 (1980).
218. The proposal was the same, except that the sponsors agreed to an oral
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tee decided to take no action on the draft resolution "while
awaiting the conclusions of the Sixth Committee on the sub-
ject."219 This was the result of clever procedural maneuvering
by India (citing a "general feeling that it was premature to
abolish capital punishment or to accept a moratorum"20 ),
abetted by Morocco."2 During this debate, retentionist states,
especially Islamic ones, sounded notably new discordant notes
concerning the UN's commitment to the goal of abolition.2
Abolition in the classic sense was diverted into efforts to
elaborate a Second Optional Protocol for abolition of the death
penalty, commenced at the same General Assembly session.
The Federal Republic of Germany22 introduced a
amendment to replac6 "the words 'Sub-Commission with the Committee on Crime
Prevention and Control.'" U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 65, 1 11,
U.N. Doc. A/35/742 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/35/742].
219. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 35th Sess., 84th mtg. 1 28, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/351SR.84 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/SR.84 (proposal by India
with amendment by Morocco). The vote on the amended decision was seventy-six
in favor, thirty-three opposed, and twenty-four abstentions. U.N. Doc. A/35/742,
supra note 218, 15(b).
220. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 35th Sess., 76th mtg. 91 27, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/35/SR.76 (1980). See also Remarks of Japan, id. 22 ("Because it was so
closely related not only to crime rates and criminal justice administration but also
to the history, culture and ethical and moral norms of each nation, the question of
retaining or abolishing the death penalty was too difficult an issue to resolve
immediately and would undoubtedly be a perennial subject for debate, both domes-
tically and internationally.").
221. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.84, supra note 219, 91 28. Several delegations pointed
out that capital punishment was not on the agenda of the Sixth (legal) Committee
of the General Assembly. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.84, supra note 219, 1 38 (Italy), 51
(Jamaica), 59 (Sweden).
222. India stated that it could not accept references to capital punishment as a
violation of the right to life and to negative consequences that would result if it
were not abolished. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.84, supra note 219, 1 22. Zaire asserted
that "[i]t had not, in fact, been established that capital punishment was a viola-
tion of human rights." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.84, supra note 219, 91 25. Oman object-
ed to the resolution "which implied a value judgement on Islamic custom and
Islamic law." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.84, supra note 219, 1 27. Ethiopia stated that
the resolution "did not seem to take account of the fact that there were many
forms of societies and Governments with different values, cultures and legal princi-
ples based on religious precepts .... " U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.84, supra note 219, 1
54.
223. With co-sponsors Austria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Italy, Por-
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resolution2' containing a draft protocol and a request that it
be circulated for comment to member states by the Secretary
General."
The four-nation proposal at the Sixth Crime Congress had
also delineated "generally accepted international human rights
standards,"2 6 consisting of minimal due process standards
and substantive restrictions on the death penalty. Though
unable to agree on the desirability of a moratorium, the Gener-
tugal and Sweden.
224. Article 1 of the draft protocol provided:
1. Each State Party shall abolish the death penalty in its territory
and shall no longer foresee the use of it against any individual subject to
its jurisdiction nor impose nor execute it.
2. The death penalty shall not be re-established in States that
have abolished it.
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm. 35th Sess., Agenda Item 65(a), at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/35/L.75 (1980).
225. The General Assembly, in decision 35/437 of 15 December 1980, circulated
the draft and asked for a report to its Thirty-sixth Session. U.N. GAOR, 35th
Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 288, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
226. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, supra note 208. These standards, drawn
from the ICCPR, were:
(a) Capital punishment may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes;
(b) Capital punishment may be imposed only in accordance with
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime;
(c) Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed
by persons below 18 years of age and shall not be carried out on preg-
nant women;
(d) Capital punishment shll not be carried out pending any ap-
peal proceedings or other proceedings relating to pardon or commutation
of sentence;
(e) Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a
final judgment rendered by a competent court after legal process which
gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial, including the right of
anyone suspected of or charged with a crime for which death sentence
may be imposed, to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the pro.
ceedings;
() Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to appeal to a
court of higher jurisdiction;
(g) Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon
or commutation of sentence;
(h) Amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence may be granted
in all cases of death sentences.
U.N. Doe. A/Conf.87/14/Rev.1, supra note 208.
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al Assembly easily adopted Resolution 35/172,27 expressing
alarm at the incidence of summary and arbitrary executions
and calling on all states to respect the death penalty restric-
tions in Article 6 of the ICCPR and the fair trial rights in Arti-
cles 14 and 15.
Heightened concern over summary and arbitrary execu-
tions channelled UN energies into two paths: (1) the appoint-
ment of a Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Exe-
cutions;22 and (2) the adoption of resolutions elaborating
minimal universal standards for substantive and procedural
restrictions on the death penalty.229 The Sub-Commission in
Resolution 1 (XXXIV) emphasized the growing problem of polit-
ically motivated executions and disappearances, suggesting
consideration of abolition of capital punishment for political
offenses .2 " Later in 1981, the General Assembly deplored the
growing incidence of summary and arbitrary executions, drew
attention to the minimal standards suggested in Resolution
35/172 of the previous year, urged the Secretary General to use
his good offices to intervene in cases where these standards
were not respected, and asked the Committee on Crime Pre-
vention and Control to examine the subject.231
The UN human rights bodies, having already tackled a
related problem by the creation of the Working Group on En-
forced and Involuntary Disappearances,2 3 2 followed suit in
227. G.A. Res. 35/172, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 195, U.N. Doc.
A/35/48 (1981).
228. Appointed pursuant to E.S.C. Res. 1982/35, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp.
No. 1, at 27, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82 (1982). The title was changed by the Commis-
sion in 1992 to that of Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, to express "a broad approach to the mandate on executions which
encompasses all violations of the right to life as guaranteed by a large number of
international human rights instruments." Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 12, at 91 7 (1992).
229. E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 33, U.N: Doc.
E/1984184 (1984) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/1984/84].
230. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.769 (1981), quoted in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
POLITICAL KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENTS 97 (1983).
231. G.A. Res. 36/22, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 168, U.N. Doc.
A/36/51 (1982).
232. E.S.C. Res. 20 (XXXVI), U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Human Rights, 36th
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1982 with a decision to appoint a Special Rapporteur on Sum-
mary and Arbitrary Executions. 3 The Special Rapporteur in
his first report noted the difficulty of defining the contours of
his mandate, especially as it relates those "summary" execu-
tions that follow inadequate judicial process or violate the
codified substantive restrictions on the scope of the death pen-
alty:
Where a government has imposed a death penalty but
failed to comply with procedural safeguards prescribed in
international law, it has violated international law and has
illegally deprived a person of his life. The deprivation of life
in such circumstances can be called extra-legal execution.
However, is it in all cases that such execution can be termed
"arbitrary" or "summary"? If a person is executed as a result
of a procedure which has not followed all the minimum guar-
antees, is the execution summary? If the execution is not
summary, what combination of the breaches of minimum
guarantees are necessary for the execution to be rendered
summary? There is a whole range, from cases with only a
single procedural defect to those where all or nearly all proce-
dural guarantees are non-existent, that the trial could be
said to have been in name only. At what stage does the trial
become summary?'
Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 180, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1408 (1980).
233. E.S.C. Res. 1982/29, U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 147, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.411982/30 (1982). The Commission adopted the resolution by a vote of
thirty-three in favor, one opposed, and eight abstentions. U.N. ESCOR, 38th Sess.,
59th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. EfCN.4/1982/SR.59 % 53 (1982). See supra note 228.
For a general examination of the "theme mechanisms" of the Commission
on Human Rights, see Menno Kamminga, The Thematic Procedures of the UN
Commission on Human Rights, 34 NETH. INTL L. REV. 299 (1987); David
Weissbrodt, The Three 'Theme" Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on
Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INTL L. 685 (1986); Joan Fitzpatrick, UN Action With
Respect to "Disappearances" and Summary or Arbitrary Executions, in AIUSA LE-
GAL SUPPORT NETWORK, THE UNivERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RiGHTs 1948-
1988, at 35 (1988).
234. Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N.
ESCOR, 39th Sess., Agenda Item 12, 55, U.N. Doc,. EICN.411983/16 (1983).
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The dilemma of the Special Rapporteur is illustrated by his
uncertainty whether he could approach governments (including
those not party to the ICCPR) who were reported to be plan-
ning the execution of juvenile offenders." 5
This aspect of the Special Rapporteur's mandate was clari-
fied to some extent by the adoption of ECOSOC Resolution
1984/50 of 25 May 1984, adopting safeguards guaranteeing
protection of those facing the death penalty, as recommended
by the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control. 6 The
235. The Special Rapporteur did address a communication to Bangladesh with
respect to reports that a student of 16 or 17 was to be executed. Summary or
Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess.,
Annex, Agenda Item 12, at 4-5, U.N. Doc. EICN.411986/21 (1986). Yet, after a
rebuff by the United States to whom similar approaches had been made, the Spe-
cial Rapporteur sought guidance from the Commission that such practices came
within the scope of his mandate. See Kamminga, supra note 233, at 303-04;
Weissbrodt, supra note 233, at 689-91.
236. See Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report by the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. ESCOR, 41st Sess., Agenda Item 12, 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411985/17 (1985).
The safeguards appended to ECOSOC resolution 1984150 were:
1. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, capital
punishment may be imposed only for the most serious crimes, it being
understood that their scope should not go beyond intentional crimes, with
lethal or other extremely grave consequences.
2. Capital punishment may be imposed only for a crime for which
the death penalty is prescribed by law at the time of its commission, it
being understood that if, subsequent to the commission of the crime,
provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby.
3. Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime shall not be sentenced to death, nor shall the death penalty be
carried out on pregnant women, or on new mothers or on persons who
have become insane.
4. Capital punishment may be imposed only when the guilt of the
person charged is based upon clear and convincing evidence leaving no
room for an alternative explanation of the facts.
5. Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court after legal process which gives
all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial, at least equal to those con-
tained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, including the right of anyone suspected of or charged with a
crime for which capital punishment may be imposed to adequate legal
assistance at all stages of the proceedings.
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safeguards drew largely, though not exclusively, on the death
penalty restrictions in the ICCPR.
Although ECOSOC prefaced Resolution 1984150 with the
caution that it "shall not be invoked to delay or to prevent the
abolition of capital punishment," 7 the safeguards began to
take on a life of their own, distinct from the UN's general con-
cern with the death penalty. While the quinquennial reports by
the Secretary General on progress toward abolition of the
death penalty continued to be compiled,238 separate reports
on compliance with the minimal safeguards were also commis-
sioned. 9 In addition, the Commission on Human Rights,
6. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to appeal to a
court of higher jurisdiction, and steps should be taken to ensure that
such appeals shall become mandatory.
7. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon,
or commutation of sentence; pardon or commutation of sentence may be
granted in all cases of capital punishment.
8. Capital punishment shall not be carried out pending any appeal
or other recourse procedure or other proceeding relating to pardon or
commutation of sentence.
9. Where capital punishment occurs, it shall be carried out so as
to inflict the minimum possible suffering.
U.N. Doc. E/1984/84, supra note 229, at 33.
237. U.N. Doc. E1984184, supra note 229, at 33. The United States attempted
to replace this language with "shall not be interpreted as affecting the consider-
ation of the question of the abolition or retention of capital punishment," noting
that the existing wording was "biased towards abolition" while the United States
was experiencing a "trend . . . towards the reintroduction of the death penalty."
The United States delegate urged that the issue of safeguards be kept "separate
from the debate on the retention or abolition of capital punishment." The United
States amendment was defeated by a vote of twenty-three in favor, six opposed,
and sixteen in abstentions. U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., 21st plen. mtg. at 81, U.N.
Doc. E/1984/SR.21 (1984).
238. See Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st
Seas., Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. E11985/43 (1985) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
E/1985/43]; see also U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc.
E/1985/43/Add.1 (1986); Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/1990/38 (1990), revised by U.N.
Doc. E/1990/38/Rev.1 (1990), revised by E/1990/38/Rev.1/Corr. 1.
239. See Implementation of the United Nations Safeguards Guaranteeing Protec-
tion of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, E.S.C. Res. 1989/64, U.N.
ESCOR, 1st Ses., Supp. 1, at 51, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (1989). E.S.C. Res. 1989/64
directed that the reports on capital punishment and on implementation of the
safeguards should be combined in the future. Id.
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ECOSOC, and the General Assembly took up the issue of sum-
mary and arbitrary executions in tandem with the periodic
renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur."4
The elaboration of minimal procedural standards, while
designed to reduce arbitrary executions, risks muting
awareness of the judicial death penalty as a human rights
issue."4 Retentionist states typically claim compliance with
such procedural minima. 2  While dubious assertions by
retentionist states that they adhere to fair process in the appli-
cation of the death penalty are difficult to contest,243 the fact
that they retain the death penalty on their statute books is
incontestible.' Consensus on the standards may reinforce
the retentionist argument that the international community
agrees that the death penalty is acceptable when inflicted with
adequate procedures, undermining the abolitionist argument
that capital punishment is inherently and under all circum-
stances incompatible with human dignity.
240. See, e.g., GA. Res. 39/110, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 206,
U.N. Doc. A139/51 (1985) (noting both the renewal of the Special Rapporteur's
mandate and the adoption of the minimal safeguards in ECOSOC resolution
1984/50).
241. As the 1985 report of the Secretary General rather opaquely noted, "[A]
trend developed in the capital punishment' question which dealt with procedural
deficiencies, as well as with procedural safeguards .... This new trend could
mark a shift from the "pro" versus "con" question, to an instrumental position
within a given legal status where procedural guarantees are applied to decrease
arbitrariness in the capital sentencing process.&" Capital Punishment: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 17, 93, U.N.
Doc. E/1985/43 (1985) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/1985/43].
242. See Implementation of the United Nations Safeguards Guaranteeing Protec-
tion of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on
Crime Prevention and Control, 10th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.57/1988/9 (1988), revised by U.N. Doc. EAC.57/1988/9/Corr. 2 (1988).
243. According to the 1985 report of the Secretary General, "[s]ome retentionist
countries reported that, in addition to [the safeguards in ECOSOC resolution
1984/501, their own legislation contained provisions exceeding those of the Cove-
nant, thus contributing to the strengthening of safeguards at the global level.
However, this process could not be fully appreciated in the replies to the question-
naire . . . ." U.N. Doc. E/1985/43, supra note 238, 50.
244. Lopez-Rey, notes that traditional proponents of abolition, such as Uruguay,
lost credibility in light of their own reported practices of summary and arbitrary
executions during this period. LOPEZ-REY, supra note 216, at 112.
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The cumulative impact of these developments on the UN's
progress toward the abolition of the death penalty must re-
main speculative,45 but the emboldenment of the retentionist
elements may be linked to the diversion of attention to the
indisputable human rights violations involved in arbitrary and
summary executions."4 Retentionist states that had been in
the habit of defending their attachment to the death penalty as
a mere temporary phenomenon pending the evolution of their
societies to a stage of greater social peace and civility began to
characterize the death penalty in more permanent terms, chal-
lenging the basic premise of General Assembly Resolution 2857
(XXVI) and the "main objective" of the UN in this area." 7
This hardening of retentionist attitudes was to present serious
obstacles to the drafing of the Second Optional Protocol.
VII. PROTOCOLS FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Just as the retentionist elements in the UN were becoming
more obstreperous, the Council of Europe was finally confront-
ing the reality of near-total abolition within its member states
and codifying it as a matter of principle in Protocol No. 6 to
the European Convention." Article 2 of the European Con-
245. Both the 1975 and 1980 quinquennial reports had indicated that progress
toward abolition was uneven at best. See U.N. Doc. E/5616, supra note 193; U.N.
Doc. E/1980/9, supra note 200.
246. For example, the United States at the Thirty-fifth Session of the General
Assembly in 1980 co-sponsored the draft resolution on summary and arbitrary
executions "because, in its opinion, it was precisely in the direction of improving
the standards applying to capital punishment that the international community
should be active. His delegation therefore looked forward to subsequent proposals
to provide the greatest possible safeguards for persons accused of crimes punish-
able by the death penalty." U.N. Doc. AIC.3/35/SR.84, supra note 219, 95. The
United States did not oppose circulating the draft protocol for comment, though it
"did not at the present time intend to subscribe to an optional protocol ... bind-
ing parties to abolish forever the death penalty." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/351SR.84, supra
note 219, % 95.
247. See GA. Res. 2857 (XXVD, supra note 2.
248. Done at Strasbourg, 28 April 1983, Council of Europe Doc. H (83) 3. En-
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vention imposed only minimal restrictions on the application of
the death penalty. After the European Committee on Crime
Problems completed its 1962 study of the death penalty in Eu-
rope, 9 the issue was not revived until 1973, with the presen-
tation of a resolution asserting that capital punishment "must
now be seen to be inhuman and degrading within the meaning
of Article 3 of the European Convention" and calling upon all
member governments to abolish it."' This resolution was re-
ferred to the Committee on Legal Affairs,"' which appointed
Mr. Lidgard as rapporteur."2 Although Lidgard prepared two
reports, the Committee on Legal Affairs failed to take any
action, prompting his resignation as rapporteur 3
The issue was again revived at the 1978 meeting of the
European Ministers of Justice at the initiative of Austrian
Minister of Justice Christian Broda.254 In 1980, the Parlia-
mentary Assembly adopted Resolution 727 (1980) which con-:
demned capital punishment as inhuman and called upon
retentionist members of the Council of Europe to abolish it for
crimes in times of peace.2 5' At the same time, the Parliamen-
tary Assembly adopted Recommendation 891 (1980) 2" which
tered into force, 1 Mar. 1985. Conventions and Agreements in the Council of Eu-
rope in the field of Human Rights, Protocol No. 6, signed Apr. 28, 1983, Council of
Eur. Doc. H/Inf (85) 1, at 6.
249. See ANCEL, supra note 119.
250. Motion for a resolution on the abolition of capital punishment, presented by
Miss Bergegren and others, Eur. Consult. Ass., 25th Sess., Doec. No. 3297 at 2
(1973).
251. Id. at 1 n.1.
252. Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 4.
253. Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 6.
254. Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 5. See also Dr. Christian Broda, The
Elimination of the Death Penalty in Europe (1985) (paper presented to the meet-
ing of European death penalty coordinators of Amnesty International, Stockholm,
30 March 1985).
At the suggestion of the European Ministers of Justice, the Committee of
Ministers placed the issue of capital punishment back on the agenda of the Euro-
pean Committee on Crime Problems. The Legal Affairs Committee appointed Mr.
Lidbom to revise the Lidgard reports and the Parliamentary Assembly considered
Lidbom's report at its 32d Session in 1980. Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 5.
255. EU. PARL. ASS. DEB., 32d Sess. (April 22, 1980).
256. Id.
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called upon the Committee of Ministers to amend Article 2 of
the European Convention in order to bring it into conformity
with Resolution 727 (1980).
A report by Mr. Lidbom, on behalf of the Legal Affairs
Committee 7 laid down the challenge for the Council of Eu-
rope member states:
[Tihe time has come to make a political choice, to decide
whether or not the retention of capital punishment is com-
patible with our conception of human rights, which is not
static.
I agree with those who think that science cannot help to
decide a question which is essentially moral and political.
Everything that could be said for and against the death pen-
alty has already been said. What remains is to make a
choice.'
Among recent noteworthy developments were the admission of
several new abolitionist states into the Council of Europe,
including Spain, which abolished capital punishment in 1978
despite a significant terrorist threat."9 The decision by Am-
nesty International in 1977 to oppose the death penalty under
all circumstances also affected European attitudes.Y°
Lidbom recommended proceeding "by stages,"2"' however,
proposing only the abolition of capital punishment during
peacetime.6 The debates on Resolutions 727 (1980) and Rec-
257. Lidbom Report, supra note 20.
258. Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 21-22. Lidbom and Lidgard began their
reports with quotations from Cesare Beccaria ("What is this right whereby men
presume to slaughter their fellows?") and Albert Camus ("In the United Europe of
tomorrow ... the formal abolition of capital punishment should be the first article
of the European Code for which we all hope."). Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at
2.
259. Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 4 (the other abolitionist states cited
were Portugal and Liechtenstein).
260. Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 4; Broda, supra note 254.
261. Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 5.
262. Lidbom noted that only seven of twenty-one Member States of the Council
of Europe retained the death penalty for crimes committed during peace (Belgium,
Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Liechtenstein (which had not imposed a death
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ommendation 891 (1980) followed predictable paths, with spe-
cial attention to the problem of terrorism by both retentionists
and abolitionists."' An amendment to preserve the death
penalty for terrorist crimes, proposed by a Turkish delegate,
was withdrawn.2 Recommendation 891 (1980) was adopted
by a vote of ninety-eight to twenty-five.265 The Committee of
Ministers responded by requesting the Steering Committee for
Human Rights to prepare a draft additional protocol, which
was adopted by the Committee of Ministers in December 1982
and opened for signature on 28 April 1983.266
B. The Second Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights
Drafting of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
began in 1980 with adoption by consensus 2 67 of General As-
sembly decision 3 5/4 3 7 , 2 circulating the draft protocol pre-
sentence in 200 years and might be regarded therefore as abolitionist), and Tur-
key). Lidbom Report, supra note 20, at 18, 21. Only France was actually executing
prisoners, at a rate of approximately one every two years. Lidbom Report, supra
note 20, at 18, 21.
263. See, e.g., EUR. PARL. ASS. DEB., 32d Sess. 57-61, 65 (1980) for remarks by
Mr. Aksoy of Turkey, Mrs. Stoffelen of the Netherlands, Mrs. Meyer of Switzer-
land, Mr. Peces-Barba of Spain, and Mr. Reddemann of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Several United Kingdom delegates stressed that capital punishment should
be a matter for each state (and indeed each parliamentarian) to decide. Capital
punishment had been abolished in the United Kingdom on a private member's bill,
and political parties did not instruct their members on the vote. See remarks of
Mr. Smith and Mr. Beith, id. at 58-59, 80-81.
264. Id. at 88.
265. Id. at 89. Resolution 727 (1980) was adopted without a roll call vote. Id.
at 87.
266. Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, Eur. Consult. Ass., Doc. H (83) 3 at 5 (1983).
267. The delegate from Yemen noted, however, that the decision was contrary
to Islamic law. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/SR.84, supra note 219, 13. Mrs. Warzazi of
Morocco, who had joined with India in blocking action on the moratorium proposal,
noted that the decision to circulate the draft Protocol was "in no way binding
upon the member states." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/SR.84, supra note 219, 15.
268. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/SR.84, supra note 219, 11 (adoption in the Third
Committee on December 5, 1980). Decision 35/437 was adopted in plenary session
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sented by the Federal Republic of Germany. 69 Decision
35/437 requested government comments on "the idea of elabo-
rating" a Second Optional Protocol to abolish the death penal-
ty. The original German proposal 270 called for total abolition:
Article 1
1. Each State Party shall abolish the death penalty in its
territory and shall no longer foresee the use of it against any
individual subject to its jurisdiction nor impose nor execute
it.
2. The death penalty shall not be re-established in
States that have abolished it.271
The pre-ambular language cited the commitment of the UN to
gradual abolition in General Assembly Resolution 2857 (XXVI)
and Resolution 32/61 and the risk of error in executions.2
Only twenty-one states submitted comments on the draft
Optional Protocol.27 Of greatest interest was the submission
by Egypt, which indicated that "the death penalty cannot be
abolished in the cases where it is laid down as hadd (pre-
scribed castigation decreed by God or the Prophet) or qisas
(equal retribution) but that the death penalty may be commut-
ed in those cases where it is laid down as ta'zir
(deterrent)." Other retentionist states based their inten-
on December 15, 1980. U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 96th plen. mtg. at 114, U.N. Doc.
A/35/PV.96 (1980).
269. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 35th Sess., Agenda Item 65(a), U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/35/L.75 (1980). No vote was taken on L.75 because the sponsors substituted
L.97 in order to get consensus agreement to circulate the draft. U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/35/SR.84, supra note 219, 1 9.
270. The proposal was co-sponsored by Austria, Costa Rica, Italy, Portugal, and
Sweden.
271. Crime Prevention and Control, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 35th Sess., Agenda
Item 65, U.N. Doc. A/35/742 (1980).
272. Id. at 11.
273. Elaboration of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty: Report
of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., at 4-20, U.N. Doc. A/36/441
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/36/441].
274. Id. at 2. Syria stated that the death penalty was "still necessary" and
that Islamic law is a "principal source" for Syrian law. Id. at 18.
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tions not to ratify the Optional Protocol upon beliefs in the
death penalty as a deterrent (even where all capital sentences
are commuted)275 or because of popular support in their coun-
try for retention."6 The United States, signalling its newly
assertive retentionism in the post-Furman era, challenged the
pre-ambular language concerning General Assembly Resolution
2857 (XXVI) and Resolution 32/61, disagreeing that "the goal is
necessarily to ban capital punishment completely."27 But
perhaps the greatest difficulty to emerge from the state com-
ments and debates in the Third Committee was a concern
about elaborating on a human rights instrument that clearly
would not be universally ratified, and consequently might pose
a challenge to the very premise of universal human rights.278
Much of the discussion at the Thirty-seventh Session in
1982 reflected what had been the early underlying consensus
within the UN on the subject of capital punishment-that
abolition was inevitable and desirable but that states would
have to proceed at their own pace in light of local conditions.
275. See, e.g., submissions by Botswana, id. at 5; Greece, id. at 9 (all sentences
since 1972 commuted); Madagascar, id. at 12 (no sentences carried out for 20
years); Cameroon, U.N. id. at 19.
276. See, e.g., submission by Japan, id. at 11. The United Kingdom indicated
that it could not ratify the Protocol because Parliament should remain free to
reinstate the death penalty. Id. at 18.
277. The United States, however, had "no reason to object if other countries
wished to adopt and accede to this Draft Protocol." Id. at 20.
278. See, e.g., submission by Finland, id. at 7 (supporting the Protocol but
alluding to "questions of principle concerning the universality of the human rights
criteria.. . ."). The delegate of the Ukrainian SSR cautioned against "calling into
question the universality of human rights by recognizing the existence of specific
rights .... " U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 36th Sess., 34th mtg. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/36/SR.34 (1981). Spain also raised the issue of the death penalty in time of
war, which remains part of Spanish law and thus might impede Spain's ability to
ratify the Protocol. U.N. Doc. A/36/441, supra note 273, at 15.
Mrs. Warzazi of Morocco suggested careful study of the proposal and
avoidance by abolitionist states of moral judgments on retentionist states. U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 36th Sess., 31st mtg. 1 14, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/36/SR.31 (1981).
Finally, a General Assembly resolution requested additional government
comments and placed the issue on the agenda of the Thirty-seventh Session. GJA.
Res. 36/59, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 174, U.N. Doc. A136/51
(1982).
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For example, retentionist states such as Algeria,"9 Togo2 0
and Barbados"' all voiced variations on this familiar refrain.
The sponsors of the Protocol stressed its optional nature.282
However, they also noted that its adoption would keep capital
punishment under discussion and encourage states to reconsid-
er their positions.'
It was precisely this symbolic significance of the Protocol
that attracted the ire of Mrs. Warzazi of Morocco, who protest-
ed that the Commission on Human Rights "had not been elect-
ed to pronounce death sentences against certain states while at
the same time allowing themselves to express value judgments
on sovereign states that retained capital punishment."' Oth-
er retentionist states suggested that the problem of summary
and arbitrary executions should be the focus of UN concern,
not retention consistent with the existing terms of Article
6.285 For the first time, a substantial number of Islamic states
279. The submission by Algeria indicated that prerogative of mercy was often
exercised and stated that "it is not inconceivable that, in time, a de facto abolition
of capital punishment will be witnessed." U.N. GAOR,. 37th Sess., Agenda Item
87(d), at 4, U.N. Doc. A/37/407 (1982).
280. Togo's submission indicated that it was following the progress of the Pro-
tocol and saw it "as a way of encouraging those countries which are already ad-
vanced in criminology to pursue their policy of liberalization, until such time as it
may gradually be extended to all the member states." Id. at 11.
281. Barbados had received a report from a consultant from Wales who sug-
gested that they abolish the death penalty unless public opinion was strongly
adverse. The parliament, however, had not yet acted on the recommendation. U.N.
GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 87(d), at 2, U.N. Doc. A/37/407/Add.1 (1982).
282. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 37th Sess., 47th mtg. J 13, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/37/SR.47 (1982) (remarks of Mr. van Well of the Federal Republic of Germa.
ny).
283. Id. 11.
284. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 37th Sess., 52d mtg. 13, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/37/SR.52 (1982). However, Morocco abstained on the resolution and Mrs.
Warzazi indicated that her government did not object to a purely procedural reso-
lution to refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights. U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 37th Sess., 67th mtg. % 71, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67 (1982) [hereinafter
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67].
285. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 37th Sess., 53d mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.53
(1982) (remarks of delegate from Japan). Japan voted in favor of the Resolution to
refer the draft Protocol to the Commission on Human Rights, however. U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/37/SR.67, supra note 284, % 72.
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objected to further consideration of the draft Protocol on
grounds of its incompatibility with Islamic law. 6 The Third
Committee adopted the resolution by a split vote of fifty-two in
favor, twenty-three opposed, with fifty-three abstentions. 87
While it may not have been apparent at the time, a turn-
ing point in UN consideration of the death penalty had been
reached. From the time of Beccaria's tract in the eighteenth
century," the experiences of other nations had been an i-
Contemporaneously, the Human Rights Committee was adopting general
comment 6(16) on Article 6. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 93-94, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982). Paragraph 6 of gen-
eral comment 6(16) stated:
While it follows from article 6(2) to (6) that States parties are not
obliged to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its
use and, in particular, to abolish it for other than the "most serious
crimes." Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their criminal laws
in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the application of
the death penalty to the "most serious crimes." The article also refers
generally to abolition in terms which strongly suggest (paras. 2(2) and
(6)) that abolition is desirable. The Committee concludes that all mea-
sures of abolition should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of
the right to life within the meaning of article 40, and should as such be
reported to the Committee. The Committee notes that a number of States
have already abolished the death penalty or suspended its application.
Nevertheless, States' reports show that progress made towards abolishing
or limiting the application of the death penalty is quite inadequate.
Id.
286. For example, the delegate from Sudan stated that abolition was "incom-
patible with the criminal code and legislation of Sudan based on the divine and
sacred laws of Islam which were immutable." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, supra note
284, 1 46. The delegate from Iran saw the draft as "an attempt to violate the
fundamental and inherent right of countries to practice their religious beliefs."
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, supra note 284, 49. For remarks by delegatbs from
Oman, Kuwait, and Somalia, see U.N. Doc. AIC.3/37/SR.67, supra note 284, It 45,
47, 50.
287. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, supra note 284, 72. A number of prominent
retentionist states voted in favor of the Resolution, including Japan and the Unit-
ed States. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, supra note 284, 72. The Resolution request-
ed the Commission on Human Rights to consider the draft Protocol at its Thirty-
ninth and Fortieth sessions, and to report to the General Assembly at its Thirty-
ninth session in 1984. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm:, 37th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 87,
at 7, U.N. Doc. A/37/718 (1982).
288. CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans.,
1963).
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portant element in the abolitionist debate, 9 both as a bea-
con of progress toward a more refined civilization and as a
source of data to disprove the deterrent effect which functioned
as the main justification for retention. The debates over the
Universal Declaration and Article 6 of the ICCPR reflect this
understanding,2" which also served as the premise for the
Ancel1 and Morris292 studies and the Secretary General's
quinquennial reports.293 Yet, as the comparative data contin-
ued to undermine the deterrence thesis,2 the advocates of
289. Great interest was shown by enlightenment theorists and rulers, for exam-
ple, in the experiment by Leopold H of Austria, then grand duke of Tuscany, to
implement a new penal code in 1786 modeled on Beccaria's ideas, including the
complete abolition of the death penalty. MARCELLO MAESTRO, CESARE BECCARIA
AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM 135 (1973). Leopold reported in 1789, that
"mild laws together with a careful vigilance" had reduced common crimes and
almost eliminated "the most atrocious" ones. Id. Jeremy Bentham and other aboli-
tionists of the nineteenth century cited the Tuscan example. HUGA ADAM BEDAU,
DEATH Is DIFFERENT: STUDiEs IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND POLTICS OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 85-86 (1987).
290. See supra at notes 24-49, 65-103.
291. ANCEL, supra note 119.
292. See supra note 142.
293. See supra note 193.
294. For a careful and balanced discussion of the continuing social science
debate over deterrence see HOOD, supra note 8, at 117-48. Hood concludes:
[T]he data analysed so far "are not sufficiently strong to lead researchers
with different prior beliefs to reach a consensus regarding the deterrent
effects of capital punishment." [citation omitted] The implications of this
conclusion for policy depend ultimately on moral and political views of
what standards of proof are required. Most of those who favour aboli-
tion ... would demand proof that executions have a substantial margin-
al deterrent effect. Those retentionists who rely on their intuitive belief
in deterrence would require substantial proof that there was no addition-
al risk to the lives of citizens before sparing murderers from execution.
The balance of evidence, looked at in this way, favours the abolitionist
position.
See HOOD, supra note 8, at 148. An extensive international bibliography on social
science and legal studies of capital punishment was compiled by the Social De-
fence Research Institute of the United Nations in 1987. U. Leone, International
Bibliography on Capital Punishment, 58 R.I.D.P. 821 (1987).
The 1985 report on Capital Punishment by the Secretary General noted of
public opinion, that belief in-the deterrent effect of capital punishment was often
only a "surface manifestation" of "more deeply held sentiments and feelings" favor-
ing execution. U.N. Doc. E/1985/43, supra note 241, 100. Zirring and Hawkins
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retention at the international level shifted their arguments, a
pattern also experienced within certain national debates on
abolition.295 The emergence of a group of Islamic states as-
serting that retention of the death penalty was an immutable
aspect of their culture presented a fundamental challenge to
the shared assumptions that underlay General Assembly Reso-
lution 2857 (XXVI).
No longer did retentionist states simply argue that their
societies had not yet managed to evolve to a state of civiliza-
tion that would enable them to take the risk of abolition. This
defense of retentionism posed no essential contradiction to the
common goal of gradual abolition, though there had been un-
dercurrents in the earlier debates suggesting important and
perhaps enduring cultural differences between abolitionist and
retentionist states.296 The emerging Islamic bloc challenged
the premise of scientific progress or more subjectively mea-
sured "evolving standards of decency"297 embedded in the
UN's commitment to gradual but universal abolition. Though a
perfected Islamic society might be one without crime, and thus
abolitionist de facto, the terms of the Shari'a law could never
be altered.
Progress on the Protocol was slow, as the Commission 29
describe public opinion surveys indicating that half of the retentionist respondents
assert that they would favor the death penalty even if it caused as many murders
as it prevented. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 8, at 17.
295. Hood, describing studies of pro-death penalty views, notes that "deterrence
is often given as the justification because it appears to provide a 'scientific' and
socially acceptable reason for supporting the death penalty. The underlying basis
of support for capital punishment has been described as 'strongly held moral and
political ideals,' 'deeply anchored in a person's personality, value and belief sys-
tems,' and as having an 'emotional, symbolic function' rather than stemming from
'a set of reasoned beliefs." See HOOD, supra note 8, at 154.
296. India, for example, cited the heterogeneous nature and low level of educa-
tion of its populace as justification for its retention, and as a contrast to the lead-
ing abolitionist states. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 35th Sess., 76th mtg. 26, U.N.
Doc. AIC.3/35/SR.76 (1980). While educational levels might increase over time,
India is unlikely to lose its heterogeneity.
297. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
298. E.S.C. Res. 1984119, U.N. ESCOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 53, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1984177 (1984), suggested that the Sub-Commission establish an inter-
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referred the matter to the Sub-Commission. After desultory
discussion at its thirty-seventh session,299 the Sub-Commis-
sion recommended the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to
analyze the pros and cons of elaborating the Protocol." ° The
General Assembly approved this plan,3"' though Islamic
states again voiced dissent. 2 The General Assembly request-
ed a report on the progress of the Commission and Sub-Com-
mission three years hence. °3
Marc Bossuyt, appointed as Special Rapporteur, prepared
a comprehensive report analyzing abolition in light of interna-
tional standards and digesting debate over the draft Optional
Protocol in the General Assembly, the Commission and the
Sub-Commission.'" He noted of this debate that "most com-
ments- concerned the desirability or not of the abolition of capi-
tal punishment. Very few comments concerned the drafting of
sessional working group to draft the instrument and report to the Commission in
1985.
299. Summarized in, Marc Bossuyt, Elaboration of a Second Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition
of the Death Penalty, U.N. ESCOR, 39th Sess., Agenda Item 9(e), 144-53, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/20 (1987) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/CN.4ISub.2/198720].
300. E.S.C. Res. 1984P7, U.N. ESCOR, 37th Sess., 33d mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/SR.33 (1984). This suggestion was accepted by Commission reso-
lution 1985/46. U.N. ESCOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 93, U.N. Doc. E/1985/22
(1985); and E.S.C. Res. 1985/41, U.N. ESCOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 29, U.N.
Doc. E/1985/85 (1986).
301. G.A. Res. 39/137, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 226, U.N.
Doc. A139/51 (1985).
302. Saudi Arabia called for a recorded vote because "the abolition of the death
penalty was incompatible with * . . Islamic principle." U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th
Sess., 60th mtg. 22, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/39/SR.60 (1984). The sponsors had negotiat-
ed with Islamic states to try to achieve consensus and reassured retentionist
states that the draft did not pass judgment on them. Id. It 18-19 (remarks of Mr.
Borehard of the Federal Republic of Germany). Kuwait expressed appreciation for
this "constructive approach," but could not support any draft "that might be inter-
preted as consent to abolish capital punishment." Id. 24. The vote in the Third
Committee was fifty-seven in favor, eighteen opposed, and fifty abstentions. Inter-
national Covenants on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Agenda
Item 8 % 11, U.N. Doc. A139/707 (1984).
303. G-A. Res. 39/137, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 226,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985).
304. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/20, supra note 299.
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the Second Optional Protocol itself."30 5 Bossuyt proposed sev-
eral refinements in the original draft presented by the seven
sponsors in 1980. These included deletion of the obligation not
to reinstate the death penalty once abolished, since this would
be implicit in the obligation not to execute any person as long
as the state remained a party to the Second Optional Proto-
col."0 ' Further, in light of the number of states retaining capi-
tal punishment only in wartime and with the aim of increasing
the number of potential ratifications, Bossuyt suggested that
states be permitted to make a reservation at the time of ratifi-
cation to permit the imposition of capital punishment for "a
most serious crime of a military nature committed during war-
time."0 7 The similarly limited scope of Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention was cited in support of this suggestion,
since it would be unrealistic to expect states to assume more
extensive obligations under a UN instrument than they would
within the framework of a regional system.0 8
Bossuyt concluded that at the time Article 6 was drafted
"there was a strong presumption in favour of the abolitioh of
the death penalty."0 9 He urged retentionist states not, to
block the efforts of abolitionist states to bind themselves with
an international commitment, noting that no state could be
forced to assume this obligation.310
The Sub-Commission's consideration of Bossuyt's report
was anticlimactic, to say the least. Action by the Sub-Commis-
sion was blocked by a procedural objection raised by the mem-
ber from the USSR.31' However, Mr. Al-Khasawneh of Jordan
indicated substantive opposition to the draft Protocol, arguing
305. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.211987/20, supra note 299, 154.
306. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4ISub.2/1987/20, supra note 299, 162.
307. U.N. Doc. ECN.4Sub.21987/20, supra note 299, 164-69.
308. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/20, supra note 299, 9 165.
309. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.211987/20, supra note 299, 91 184.
310. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/20, supra note 299, 1 186.
311. Mr. Sofinsky protested that the report was not available in the Russian
language. U.N. ESCOR, 39th Sess., 36th mtg. 1 65, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.21987/SR.36 (1987). The Sub-Commission voted four in favor, three
opposed and six abstentions to take no action on the report. Id. 91 68.
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that it could not really be regarded as "optional" when many
states could not ratify it. He questioned whether the Sub-Com-
mission could draft an instrument that was contrary to the
practices of the majority of states. 12 With sponsors express-
ing disappointment with the Sub-Commission's inaction, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution at its forty-second
session in 1987 simply indicating its intention to return to the
subject at its Forty-fourth session.313
At its Fortieth session in 1988, the Sub-Commission adopt-
ed a resolution to forward Bossuyt's report to the Commis-
sion."1 4 Mr. Al-Khasawneh again argued that the Protocol
could not be regarded as optional when many states, particu-
larly Islamic ones, could not ratify."5 Mr. Eide of Norway re-
plied that, while he was not an expert on Islam, his under-
standing was that religious precepts evolved over time, and
thus Islamic states could ratify in the future when interpreta-
tions changed.1 6
Few Islamic countries replied to the request of the Com-
mission on Human Rights 17 that they forward their views on
312. U.N. ESCOR, 39th S'ess., 25th mtg. 5 11-12, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/Sub.2/1987/SR.25 (1987).
313. GA . Res. 421, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 320, U.N. Doc.
A/42/49 (1987). Recorded votes were taken both in the Third Committee (sixty-two
in favor, seventeen opposed, and thirty-five abstentions) and in plenary session
(sixty-four in favor, fifteen opposed, and fifty-seven abstentions). Though the Unit-
ed States had voted in favor of the resolution in the Third Committee, U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 42d Sess., 53d mtg. % 64, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/42/SR.53 (1987) there-
inafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/42/SR.53], consistent with its earlier position, it abstained
in the plenary session. U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., 93d mtg. at 40, U.N. Doc.
A/42/PV.93 (1987). Several Islamic states noted the religious basis for their nega-
tive votes during the vote in the Third Committee. See, e.g., Remarks of Kuwait,
U.N. Doc. AIC.3/42/SR.53, supra, 63; Remarks of Iran, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
42d Sess., 54th mtg. 91, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/42/SR.54 (1987) ("inconsistent with the
divine laws of Islam").
314. U.N. ESCOR, 40th Sess., 36th mtg. 60, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/SR.36 (1988).
315. U.N. ESCOR, 40th Sess., 19th mtg. 19, U.N. . Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/SR.19 (1988).
316. Id. J 38.
317. E.S.C. Res. 1989/25, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 80, U.N.
Doc. E11989/20 (1989).
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the draft Second Optional Protocol to the Secretary General in
advance of the General Assembly's forty-fourth session. 18
Egypt cited deterrent, rather than immutable religious, con-
cerns in justification for its retentionist stance.319 Egypt criti-
cized Amnesty International's opposition to the death penalty
as "emotional and irrational," and accused it of ignoring "the
circumstances of different human societies" and the "practical
reality of many countries of the world."32 Japan indicated a
hardening of its views on the draft Protocol, stating that no
treaty should be adopted that did not have the support of a
majority of countries.3 ' Japan also suggested that in light of
the rejection of the Uruguayan/Colombian proposal in the
drafting of Article 6,.21 the Second Optional Protocol was re-
ally an improper amendment to the ICCPR.323
Debate within the Third Committee at the forty-fourth
session in 1989 was relatively brief, but contentious. The spon-
sors of the draft Protocol failed in their efforts to craft a resolu-
tion with language neutral enough to garner adoption without
a vote.3  Several opponents turned the question into a
North/South issue, with Egypt characterizing the Protocol as "a
racist, imperialist idea which certain countries were seeking to
impose on the 115 countries which still had the death
penalty." 25 Iraq suggested that, since only one-third of UN
members were abolitionist, adoption of the Protocol "would
mean that many countries were hypocritical or that they had
318. The responses were compiled into U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item
98, U.N. Doc. A/44/592 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/44/592].
319. Id. at 17.
320. Id. at 12.
321. Id. at 25.
322. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.644, supra note 87.
323. U.N. Doc. A/44/592, supra note 318, at 26.
324. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess., 50th mtg. J 72, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/44/SR.50 (1989) (remarks of Mr. Wentzel of the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny, introducing draft Resolution A/C.3/441L.42).
325. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess., 52d mtg. 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/441SR.52
(1989) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52] (The Egyptian delegate also suggest-
ed that if the sponsors regarded the Protocol as optional "they should keep-it to
themselves and not impose it on the international community.").
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succumbed to pressure [which] would be an extremely undem-
ocratic approach for a Committee which was supposed to de-
fend human rights, democracy and self-determination."
32 6
Some retentionist opponents of the Protocol cited the tradi-
tional notion that although abolition was "commendable," not
all societies were yet prepared for it. 27 The resolution to pro-
mulgate the Second Optional Protocol was adopted in the
Third Committee by a divided vote of fifty-five in favor, twen-
ty-eight opposed, and forty-five abstentions. 8
C. The Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
to Abolish the Death Penalty
Attention to abolition as a human rights issue was revived
by the IACHR at its Sixty-third session in 1984. The Commis-
sion resolved "in accordance with the spirit of Art. 4... and
the universal trend to eliminate the death penalty, to call on
all countries in the Americas to abolish it.""9 Following its
return to democratic government,"' Uruguay took the lead in
proposing the pursuit of this objective by means of codification
in treaty form. In 1987 the IACHR appended to its annual
report a draft Additional Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty.3 ' The OAS
General Assembly referred this draft to the Committee on Ju-
ridical and Political Matters and requested member states to
326. Id. V" 11.
327. Id. T1 15. China also expressed fear that the adoption of the Protocol
would lead to "pressure" on retentionist states. This concern was also raised by
Morocco. Id. 91 17.
328. 44 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Items 83-161, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/44/824 (1989). The United States, without explanation, voted for the first time
against the Resolution. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44ISR.62, supra note 325, 23.
329. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
1984-1985, OAS, 81st Sess., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.LJV/II.66 doc. 10 rev.1 at 10
(1985).
330. In March 1985, an elected civilian government took power and restored
constitutional rule. AMNESTY INVTL, REPORT 1986, at 201-04 (available from Amnes-
ty Int'l, New York, N.Y., Al Index:POL 01/03/86).
331. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN "COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
1986-1987, OAS 70th Sess., OAS Doc. OEASer.LIV/II.71 doc. 9 rev.1 at 272 (1987).
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submit observations on it.3"2 Uruguay submitted a draft
which provided simply: "No state party to this additional proto-
col shall apply the death penalty in its territory to any person
subject to its jurisdiction."33
Progress was slowed by the dearth of state comments on
the draft Additional Protocol, and the Committee on Juridical
and Political Matter requested additional time for study.3
The Committee established a Working Group in August 1989
to examine the two drafts, those of the IACHR and Uru-
guay. 35 The Working Group's report and draft of April
199036 identified three main issues: (1) to define the nature
of the Protocol as an addition of a new right, the progressive
development of an existing right, or an amendment to the
American Convention;3 7 (2) to determine whether the pre-
332. AG/RES 889 (XVII-0/87).
333. Draft Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty, Submitted by the Permanent Mission of Uruguay, OAS
Doc. OEA/Ser.GICP/CAJP-706/88 (1988).
334. In addition to the proposal by Uruguay, observations had been received
only from Venezuela by the time the Committee met in 1988. OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.G/CP/CAJP-706/88 add.1 (1988); Report of the Committee on Juridical and
Political Matters on the Draft Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.19 37/88
(1988). The Committee received an extension of time' to study the issue in
AG/RES. 943 (XVIII-0/88). The Committee set a deadline of June 1989 for com-
ments. Report of the Committee on Juridical and Political Matters on the Draft
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty, OAS Doc. OEAISer.GICP/doc.2022189 corr.1, at 1 (1989) [hereinafter
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.202289 corr.1]. By October 1989, comments had been
received only from Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. at 2.
335. Members included Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venekuela. OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.2022189 corr.1, supra note 334, at 6.
336. Report of the Chairman of the Working Group to Review the Draft Addi-
tional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, appended to OAS Doc. OEAISer.P/AG.doc.2559/90, at 5-12 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Draft Additional Protocol].
337. Id. at 8. The Working Group deleted the word "additional" from the Uru-
guayan draft of Article 1 on grounds that "adoption of this Protocol was not
meant to include a new human right but to reflect the progressive development of
the American Convention on Human Rights."
In the debates within the Permanent Council in May 1990, the representa-
tive of Mexico questioned whether the Protocol was an amendment or an addition-
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ambular language should refer to capital punishment as being
"cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment;"33 8 and, (3) to
determine whether, similar to the Second Optional Protocol,
states should be permitted to enter reservations at the time of
ratification to preserve the death penalty in wartime."'
Within the Permanent Council, only Jamaica raised concerns
about the substance of the Protocol, noting that it was a party
to the Convention but also a retentionist state and, thus,-un-
able to participate in the drafting efforts.' 4
While other states expressed difficulties with the Protocol
during the General Assembly debates in June 1990,34 the
al protocol and noted that Article 77 of the American Convention required approv-
al of the states parties (not the entire OAS General Assembly) of additional proto-
cols, while Article 76 established a distinct procedure for amendments. The Mexi-
can delegate regarded Article 1 of the draft as a "modificacion" and iiot a
"desarrollo" (development) of Article 4 of the Convention. This led the delegate to
the conclusion that the draft in essence was an "enmienda" (amendment) to Article
4. Mexico preferred either an explicit amendment to Article 4(2) or a separate
convention on abolition. Transcripcion del Acta de la Sesion Ordinaria del Consejo
Permanente de la Organization celebrada el 9 de mayo de 1990, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.G/CP/ACTA 816/90 at 2-5 (1990). The delegate from Uruguay replied that
the Protocol was not an amendment to the Convention, since it would not require
any change in internal laws among retentionist states that did not ratify the Pro-
tocol. Id. at 5. The issue was solved by providing in the resolution that the Gener-
al Assembly submit the Protocol to the states parties for their adoption. Id. at 11-"
17.
338. See supra note 336, at 8. This pre-ambular language was not included in
the draft sent to the General Assembly. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/doc.2632/90, at 2
(1990) [hereinafter OAS Doc. OEAISer.P/AG/doc.2632/90].
339. Draft Article 2 of the Working Group would permit states to enter reser-
vations "to apply the death penalty in wartime [as defined under international
law] for extremely serious crimes of a military nature [committed by the mili-
tary]." The brackets indicated a lack of agreement within the Working Group.
Supra note 336, at 9, 11. The draft sent to the General Assembly preserved the
words in the first but not the second set of brackets. OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.P/AG/doc.2632/90, supra note 338.
340. See Draft Additional Protocol, supra note 336, at 9. The Jamaican delegate
also objected to pre-ambular language that stated that the states parties to the
Convention expressed an intention to adopt the Protocol "with a view to consoli-
dating the practice of not applying the death penalty in the Americas." See supra
note 336, at 9. This objection was met by deleting the word "the" in the pre-
ambular paragraph ("States Parties... have expressed their intention"). Draft
resolution, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/doe.2632190, supra note 338, at 2.
341. Jamaica and Barbados noted that as retentionist countries they could not
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United States struck a particularly contentious note. Request-
ing a vote on the resolution, the United States insisted on the
following:
[It is] important that governments' opinions on this issue be
clear. The United States does not support or seek abolition of
the death penalty. In our view, imposition of the death penal-
ty for very serious crimes after a fair trial with the full
protections of due process, offered by an effective judiciary, is
not a violation of fundamental human rights or of interna-
tional law. The United States therefore does not regard this
Protocol as setting a new political or moral norm or as con-
tributing to the development of new legal principles binding
on all states. We have also voted "no" because the resolution
in its fourth preambular paragraph states that the adoption
of the Protocol is important for the inter-American system.
This statement implicitly criticizes both the internal laws of
the significant number of states that retain the death penalty
and the careful compromise incorporated into the American
Convention on Human Rights, which allows states to retain
the death penalty but does not permit it to be instituted in
the first instance or reinstituted once abolished. 2
While stopping short of a denial that the question of the death
penalty is one of human rights at all, the position of the Unit-
ed States presented a challenge to the underlying assumption
that abolition was a long-term common goal."'
ratify the Protocol. Asamblea General, Actas y Documentos, Volumen II segunda
parte, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.PMXO.2, at 321 (1991). Mexico indicated that although
it was abolitionist, it could not ratify the Protocol because the exception permitted
in Article 2 was narrower than the provisions of its constitution. Id. Guatemala
also stated that its internal law was not consistent with the Protocol. Id.
342. 'Asamblea General, Actas y Documentos, volumen H, primera parte, OAS
Doc. OEA/Ser.PKXO.2, at 250-51 (1991).
343. The United States, not having ratified the American Convention, could not
in any case ratify the Protocol.
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VIII. CONTINUING SYMBOLISM OF THE DEATH PENALTY AS AN
INTERNATIONAL ISSUE
International surveys of the death penalty continue to
evidence gradual abolitionist trends, mixed with continued
retention and even expansion in some regions.' This picture
does not vary from that noted by Ancel in the early 1960s."
But this surface resemblance masks real changes in the inter-
national dynamic of death penalty debate.
While abolitionist energies at the international level have
been diverted toward the three protocols, the end result argu-
ably is to present abolition as the specialized concern of a
small group of distinctive societies that become parties to these
instruments."5 Continued debate of capital punishment as a
general human rights issue and of abolition as a common, if in
some instances remote, goal has become more difficult in the
1990s. The failure of a proposal for a three-year moratorium on
344. See HOOD, supra note 8; Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 1, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/1990/38/Rev.1
59 (1990) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/1990/38/Rev.1] (noting eleven countries abolish-
ing the death penalty between 1984-1989, an increase in reported death sentences
and a decline in reported excutions since the last reporting period, but inconsisten-
cy in the sources of available data).
345. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 35.
346. Fifteen states had ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR as
of February 1993, and seven additional states had signed it. Fourteen were Euro-
pean (only Romania not being Western European), six were Latin American and
the other two were Australia and New Zealand. A Summary of Events on the
Death Penalty and Moves Toward World Wide Abolition, DEATH PENALTY NEWS
Feb. 1993, (available from Amnesty Int'l, New York, N.Y., AI Index: ACT 53/01/93)
[hereinafter DEATH PENALTY NEWS]. Eighteen states had ratified Protocol No. 6 to
the European Convention as of February 1993: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Council of
Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, Date: 04/02/93. The Czech Republic
and the Slovak Republic, which divided in January 1993 after the Czech and Slo-
vak Republic had ratified Protocol No. 6, may also soon be recognized as parties
to the Protocol. DEATH PENALTY NEWS, supra. Only one state, Panama, has rati-
fied the OAS Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty, although five others have
signed it. DEATH PENALTY NEWS, supra.
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the death penalty at the Eighth Crime Congress in 1990 and
the complete inability of the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE) to grapple with the death penalty as
a human rights issue serve as sobering object lessons. On the
other hand, the exclusion of the death penalty as a possible
punishment within the competence of the UN International
Tribunal on War Crimes in ex-Yugoslavia4 7 signals continu-
ing UN attachment to the abolitionist principle.
Efforts to use the crime congresses as a springboard for
promotion of an international death penalty moratorium date
back to the Sixth Crime Congress in 1980.8 Following defeat
of the moratorium proposal in the Sixth Crime Congress,
3 4 9
and later in 1980 at the General Assembly,350 the death pen-
alty did not even appear as an agenda item at the Seventh
Crime Congress in 1985.31' But responding to ECOSOC Reso-
lution 1990/51,352 the Eighth Crime Congress confronted the
issue of capital punishment35 3 in the guise of a revamped
moratorium proposal by Italy and thirty-four diverse co-
sponsors.3  The key operative paragraph invited 55
347. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 808, % 112, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 197, 198 (1993); see also Julia Preston, Balkan War Crimes Tribunal Estab-
lished, WASH. POST, May 26, 1993, at A25.
348. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/C.1/L.1, supra note 209.
349. See supra notes 209-16.
350. See supra notes 217-22.
351. Amnesty International did organize an ancillary meeting on judicial and
extrajudicial executions at the Seventh Crime Congress. See Dr. Christian Broda,
Statements at the Seventh U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime, AMNESTY
INTL REPORT, Aug. 1985 (available from Amnesty Int'l, New York, N.Y., Al Index:
ACT 05/28/85); Robert Badinter, AMNESTY INTL REPORT (available from Amnesty
Int'l, New York, N.Y., AI Index: ACT 05/27/85), Aug. 27, 1985.
352. ECOSOC Res. 1990/51 of July 24, 1990 requested the Eighth Crime Con-
gress to examine the question of capital punishment thoroughly. U.N. ESCOR, 2d
Sess., Supp. No. lA, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/1990/90/Add.1 (1991).
353. United Nations, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders, 1% 307-11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1
(1990) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1].
354. The co-sponsors were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Mo.
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States which have not abolished capital punishment to con-
sider the possibility of establishing, within the framework of
their national legislations, a moratorium in its application, at
least on a three-year basis, or creating other conditions under
which capital punishment is not imposed or executed, so as to
permit a study of the effects of abolition on a provisional ba-
sis .... 36
Presentation of the moratorium proposal was a clever
strategy, playing on the deepest and least controversial chords
in the UN's long consideration of the death penalty. A morato-
rium would provide the "laboratory conditions" for each
retentionist state to study the effects of abolition under the
"circumstances prevailing"57 within its own society. For this
reason, the proposal could be supported by retentionist as well
as abolitionist states, since the results of the "experiment"
were not mandated. The flaws in the quinquennial surveys and
in the existing social science literature consist mainly of a
dearth of data on developing countries358 and an inability to
compare data over time because of discontinuity in sources.
Compliance with the moratorium proposal would permit each
retentionist state to study the alleged deterrent effect of capi-
tal punishment, with the sponsors obviously assuming that the
experiments would disprove such effect.
Whether the moratorium strategy, if adopted by the Crime
Congress, would have advanced its sponsors' objectives is open
zambique, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, Po-
land, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
355. Draft Resolution A/CONF.1441C.2/L.7, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144128/Rev.1, supra note 353, % 352.
356. U.N. Doc. AICONF.14428/Rev.1, supra note 353. The draft Resolution also
noted a trend toward de facto and de jure abolition and, "while recognizing the
diversity of political, economic, social, cultural and religious systems," expressed
the hope that the death penalty would not be extended but would be gradually re-
stricted by each state "taking into account the circumstances prevailing in- each
country... ." U.N. Doc. AICONF.144128/Rev.1, supra note 353.
357. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, supra note 353 (quoting draft Resolution).
358. Leone, supra note 294.
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to doubt. Belief in deterrence no longer explains the policy
choices of a large number of retentionist states, and conclusive
scientific proof of the absence of deterrence will not move all
States toward the abolitionist goal. 59 As the Secretary
General's 1990 survey concluded, "capital punishment has a
far greater symbolic than practical significance."36
Islamic states, in particular, coalesced to defeat the mora-
torium despite its cautious phrasing.36' Islamic states even
urged that the time-worn phrase drawn from Article 6 of the
ICCPR, "States which have not abolished the death penalty,"
be replaced by the phrase, "States whose legal systems do not
constitute absolute impediments to the abolition of capital
punishment."
3 62
Challenges to the previous international consensus on
abolition as an ultimate goal have created new barriers to
progress at the international level, even in fora where Islamic
states play a marginal role. These barriers are visible in the
failures of the CSCE to include abolition, either immediate or
remote, among the human rights principles to which it is com-
mitted. Despite rapid and continuing evolution of its human
359. See HOOD, supra notes 294-95.
360. U.N. Doc. E/1990/38/Rev.1, supra note 344, 62 (referring to the fact that
many states extending capital punishment to new crimes fail to impose the pen-
alty on any offenders). See also Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the
Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW &
SOC. REV. 21 (1982) (studies of pro-death penalty support in the United States
reveal predominance of symbolic over instrumental concerns).
361. A move by Islamic states to postpone a decision until the Ninth Crime
Congress was deflected. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144128/Rev.1, supra note 353, 1 343-
47. The draft Resolution was adopted by the Second Committee of the Crime Con-
gress by a vote of forty in favor, twenty-one opposed, and sixteen abstentions.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144128/Rev.1, supra note 353, 350. The draft Resolution was
defeated, for lack of a two-thirds majority, in the plenary by a vote of forty-eight
in favor, twenty-nine opposed, and sixteen abstentions. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144128/Rev.1, supra note 353, 358. The USSR voted in favor and led an
effort to close off debate to get the Resolution out of committee. Roger S. Clark,
Introduction to The Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, August 27-September 7, 1990, 1
CRiM. L.F. 513, 519 (1990).
362. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144128/Rev.1, supra note 353, % 337 (oral amendment
proposed by Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen).
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rights machinery and standards,63 the CSCE participants
have been completely stalled on the question of the death pen-
alty, agreeing on no more than to "keep the question of capital
punishment under consideration."3" This paralysis is espe-
cially striking, given the strong trend toward abolition in both
Western and Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era. 65 But
two of the key players in the CSCE process, the United States
and Russia, remain retentionist-the former increasingly more
strident as it continues an expansionist trend.
The contemporary symbolic importance of the death penal-
ty extends beyond the religious/nationalist dimension perceived
by Islamic states or the prickliness of powerful retentionist
states..66 In the context of national debates on the death pen-
alty, abolition is still widely perceived, as it has been since the
eighteenth century, as an emblem of advancing civilization.
Nations emerging from a period of oppression frequently in-
clude abolition prominently among the reforms intended to
363. See generally Thomas Buergenthal, CSCE Human Dimension: The Birth of
a System, in 1 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 163
(1992).
364. Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Document of the Mos-
cow Meeting on the Human Dimension, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1686 1 36
(1991). The Moscow Document merely recalled similar commitments expressed in
the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Human Dimension of 1990, re-
printed in 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1314 17 (1990), and the Concluding Document of the
Vienna Meeting 1986 of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 527, 535 9 24 (1989). At the Helsinki Follow-Up
meeting in July 1992, the CSCE again agreed only to affirm the commitments of
the Moscow and Copenhagen documents. Helsinki Decisions, 13 HUM. RTS. L.J.
288, 301 58 (1992).
365. For example, Czechoslovakia (before its split), Hungary, Romania, Slovenia
and Croatia have all abolished the death penalty, as had the German Democratic
Republic even prior to its unification with the Federal Republic of Germany. List,
supra note 12. See also Theodore S. Orlin, The Prohibition of the Death Penalty:
An Emerging International Norm? in HLMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING EAST/WEST
PERSPECTIVE 136 (Allan Rosas & Jan Helgesen eds., 1990).
366. On the growing obstructionism of the United States, see discussion of OAS
Protocol, supra notes 329-43. Japan voted against the moratorium proposal at the
Eighth Crime Congress, supra note 361, and against adoption of the Second Op-
tional Protocol, supra note 328. The United States also voted against the Second
Optional Protocol and did not attend the Eighth Crime Congress, which was held
in Cuba.
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mark their new status as respecters of fundamental human
rights.3
67
The four examples that follow illustrate the often complex
ways the retention or abolition of the death penalty, by demo-
cratic or autocratic means, serves as a touchstone for other
governmental interests. These domestic debates often mirror
the debate at the international level, while at the same time
the two debates influence each other. The examples will reveal
the following: (1) how total abolition, or a death penalty mora-
torium, manifests a newly-democratic government's rhetorical
commitment to human rights; (2) how continuing strife in
newly democratic states can erode the power of an initial sym-
bolic abolitionist act and tempt a regime which has lost control
of events to seek reinstatement of the death penalty; and, (3)
how the death penalty functions as a symbol of a regime's
commitment to religious values to appease domestic constitu-
encies and of nationalism on the international plane.
Diverse factors, including the role of opposition parties,
have influenced the course of debate in each of the countries
profiled here. Some of these factors include: religious tradi-
tions, both Islamic and Christian, and the ways in which par-
ticipants in the debate invoke them; the relationship between
the executive and the constituent body; and the increasing
reference to public opinion as a validator of capital punish-
ment. Public opinion appears to have replaced the committee
of experts as the reference body of choice on the question of the
death penalty at both national and international levels.36 s
367. In 1987 Haiti and the Philippines abolished the death penalty; as did
Romania and Slovenia in 1989; and Croatia, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Hun-
gary, Mozambique and Namibia in 1990. The National Assembly of Angola ap-
proved an abolitionist constitutional amendment in August 1992. List, supra note
12.
368. For example, the expert Committee on Crime Prevention and Control has
been replaced by a Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, a func-
tional commission of ECOSOC consisting of state representatives. See Report of the
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1992/30 (1992).
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A. Peru
Peru's experience of the death penalty embodies the ro-
mantic ninteenth century Latin American tradition of libera-
tion and democracy, with rejection of the death penalty as the
tool of autocrats against political activists.369 The Peruvian
constitution of 1856 abolished the death penalty, but it was
rapidly reinstated in 1860 for aggravated homicide and extend-
ed in 1920 for treason. ° Peru became abolitionist again in
1924, but beginning in 1949 the death penalty was extended
by successive military regimes to various terrorist crimes. 1
The 1979 constitution that marked a return to civilian rule
abolished the death penalty for all crimes except treason in
times of external war.72 The death penalty no longer was to
be used as a weapon against internal enemies, either political
or common criminal.
At the time of this writing, however, Peru is engaged in a
grotesque masque in which the death penalty, visions of the
nature of democracy, and the interaction of the national and
international discourses on the death penalty blend in complex
fashion. Two important events have set the stage for the pres-
ent -tensions. First, President Alberto Fujimori dissolved the
Congress in April 1992 and instituted a Government of Emer-
gency and National Reconstruction ruling by decree.73
Fujimori's action came after more than a decade of internal
strife accompanied by massive atrocities committed both by
security forces and insurgents, especially Sendero
369. Other Latin American states have been more constant in their adherence
to abolition as an emblem of independence and democracy, as well as more ad-
verse to its imposition for political crimes. Venezuela has been completely aboli-
tionist since 1863 (and abolitionist for political crimes since 1849), Costa Rica
since 1877, Uruguay since 1907 and Colombia since 1910. AMNESTY INTL, WHEN
THE STATE KILLS 191 (1989) [hereinafter WHEN THE STATE KILLS].
370. Id. at 190.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 191.
.373. Nathaniel C. Nash, Peruvian Election Free of Fraud, U.S. Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at A5.
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Luminoso. 74 Thousands have disappeared and were presum-
ably killed by government agents,"5 despite Peru's officially
abolitionist status. Upon taking office in 1990, Fujimori assert-
ed that terrorist violence could not justify such human rights
violations and committed himself to preserving democracy
within Peru's constitutional traditions. 7  Yet by 1992,
Fujimori had come to the conclusion that he had to jettison
Peruvian democracy in order to "save" it. Some of his measures
have' attracted substantial popular and military support,
though they have provoked international condemnation.37"
The death penalty moved to prominence with the Septem-
ber 1992 arrest of Sendero Luminoso leader Abimael
Guzman.37 8 Fujimori suggested that execution might be ap-
propriate for Guzman, despite the absence of any law provid-
ing for such a penalty.179 Even the adoption of a prospective
capital punishment law would pose a serious problem for Pe-
ru-as a paity to the American Convention on Human
Rights,"' Peru is forbidden to reinstate or extend the appli-
cation of the death penalty. Fujimori and his political allies
began to float the idea of denouncing the American Convention
374. Over 24,000 persons have been killed in political violence in Peru since
1980. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1992 at 309-15 (1991) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
375. See Annual Report of Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1990-
1991, OAS 9th Seas., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/l.79 rev. 1 Doc. 12 251-422 (1991)
(reports on individual cases of disappeared Peruvians). Peru has the highest rate
of recent disappearances in the world. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
374, at 310.
376. Peru: Human Rights during the Government of President Alberto Fujimori,
May 1992, (available from Amnesty Int'l, New York, N.Y., AI Index: -AMR
46/18192).
377. William R. Long, Peru's Pain May Be Giving Way to Improvement, L.A.
TIMES, July 4, 1992, at A13.
378. Next, Legislation Will be Retroactive; San Jose Pact Withdrawal Heralds
Death Penalty, LAT. AM. WKLY. REP., Oct. 29, 1992, at 2, available in LEXIS,
Nexis library [hereinafter LAT. AM. WKLY. REP.].
379. Death Penalty in Peru, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 16, 1992, at A23.
380. OJ.LS.T.S. No. 36, supra note 17, art. 4.
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in order to permit the adoption of the death penalty for terror-
ist crimes.38'
Concerns about negative international reaction have
caused Fujimori to seek alternatives to renunciation of the
American Convention. One proposal would simply redefine the
insurgency as an "external" war (on the premise that Sendero
Luminoso receives financing from foreign sources) in order to
avoid a clear conflict with the provisions of the 1979 Constitu-
tion.8 2 However, the, draft constitution circulated in June
1993 by the Democratic Constitutent Congress would drop the
"foreign war" clause and extend the death penalty to other acts
of treason and terrorism.3' A referendum on the revised con-
stitution is planned.3" According to the president of the Con-
gressional Commission on the Constitution, "the decision to
impose the death penalty has been made, it has the backing of
[a] majority of the electorate, and so it will prevail. The jurists
will just have to find the most adequate way of implementing
it."3" Among the suggestions for reinstating the death penal-
ty without renouncing the American Convention is a strategy
for partial amendment to the Convention.8.
The Peruvian situation illustrates how the international-
ization of the death penalty issue can create barriers to the
quick imposition of capital punishment by a regime seeking to
demonstrate control over a situation that in fact eludes it. In
Peru, it is clear that the state does not possess a monopoly of
force. Both insurgents and undisciplined security forces exer-
cise authority over large parts of the state territory. The death
381. LAT. AM. WKLY. REP., supra note 378.
382. DEATH PENALTY NEWS, supra note 346, at 1.
383. Peru: New Constitution Debated, Death Penalty & Presidential Reelection
Central Issues, NOTISUR, June 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NOTSUR File.
384. Id.
385. Abraham Lama, Peru: Government Seeks Legal Mechanisms to Impose
Death Penalty, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, INPRES File.
386. Id. (quoting former Senator Enrique Bernales, who bases his suggestion
partially on the dubious proposition that the American Convention "was signed
before the phenomenon of terrorism emerged").
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penalty, a symbol of the exclusive power of the state to make
life and death determinations, tempts as a means to shore up
the appearance of power in the political center. The display of
Guzman in his cage..v and the invocation of emergency pow-
ers were likewise ammunition in the battle for the loyalty of a
battered public.
But Fujimori, at least temporarily, found his attempted
show of strength baffled. The cost of the reimposed death pen-
alty would be greater than the gain if it came at the expense of
denouncement and repudiation of the entire system for the
protection of human rights in the Americas. The proposal to
redefine the nature of the insurgency to accomplish "constitu-
tional" extension of the death penalty and the more recent
attempt to reintroduce the death penalty "democratical-
ly,"--that is, by popular vote-present the international com-
munity with a difficult dilemma. The transparent violation of
the substance of Article 4 of the American Convention could be
vigorously protested,88 or the international community might
tolerate it for the sake of giving the embattled Fujimori flexi-
bility to redefine "democracy" under extreme circumstances.
The impatience of the Peruvian public with objections to the
fairness of Guzman's trial signals that the international
community's leverage over the Peruvian situation may be lim-
ited.389
387. Guzman Meets Press, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 25, 1992, at 14 (Guzman dis-
played by military in "specially constructed cell").
388. If the Peruvian legislation is adopted, it could be challenged through an
advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as was done in
a similar instance concerning Guatemala. I-A Court H.R., Restrictions to the Death
Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983, Series A, no. 3. See also Death penalty
proposal violates the American Convention on Human Rights, Amnesty Internation-
al, AI Index: AMR 46/18/93 (1993).
389. Adriana von Hagen & William R. Long, Peru Guerrilla Chieftain Gets Life
Term in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at A4; Douglass W. Cassel & Anthony
D'Amato, Justice: A Victim in Peru, CHRIST. SCI. MON'T, Oct. 27, 1992, at 18. The
Catholic Church appears divided on the issue of the reintroduction of the death
penalty and thus unlikely to play a significant role. Abraham Lama, Peru: Church
Refuses to Join Open Debate on Death Penalty, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 16,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES file.
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Fujimori's recourse to public opinion via a referendum
provides him with some measure of protection from criticism
that his death penalty proposal is another signal that his re-
gime represents a return to authoritarianism and a betrayal of
democracy. Fujimori's death penalty proposal is intended to
serve a 'reassurance" function with respect to Peruvian public
opinion39 which some elements in the international commu-
nity might try to accomodate, so long as the shell of democracy
and international human rights protection are not entirely lost.
B. The Philippines
The 1987 abolition of the death penalty, welcomed as a
rejection of the Marcos era and a commitment to human
rights, was tenuous from the beginning.39' Article III, Section
9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the death penalty
shall not be imposed "unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it.... " 9 2 The transition to democracy brought the unleash-
ing of powerful new elements of public opinion, without guar-
anteeing that the criminal justice system would be rid of the
many flaws inherited from the earlier autocratic period. Calls
for the reimposition of the death penalty to combat organized
crime-particularly drug crimes and kidnappings by rings that
include corrupt police and security agents-signal the desper-
ation of an elected government for a measure to symbolize a
control and strength it does not really possess."'
390. See Barbara A. Stoltz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in
Symbolic Politics, 5 LAW & POLy Q. 157, 163-165 (1983).
391. The vote in the Constitutional Commission was nineteen in favor and
eighteen opposed. Case Studies in the Use of the Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT1
REPORT Apr. 1989, at 10 (Amnesty Intl, New York, N.Y., AI Index: ASA 35/08/89)
[hereinafter Case Studies].
392. Id. at 9.
393. General Proposes Execution for Corrupt Officials, REUTER LIBR. REP.," Nov.
29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File; Manila Searches for
Kidnapped Spanish Nuns, AGENCE FRANCE PRESsE, Jan. 18, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File. A Ministry of Defense official defended a 1989
proposal for reimposition of the death penalty as follows:
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Reports indicating strong support in Congress for reimpo-
sition of the death penalty were borne out by recent votes in
both the Senate and the House to reintroduce it. 94 Oppo-
nents strive to link the issue to the nation's sorry history of
human rights abuse. 95 In this effort they are aided by aboli-
tionist elements in the international human rights community,
who regard potential retrocession by the Philippines as a seri-
ous setback."9 President Fidel Ramos seeks to provide the
Taking into account the rise in criminality and lawlessness in the coun-
try, the pestering insurgency, and the alarming incidents of violent
crimes; and considering further the observations and recommendations
coming from the military and police establishments, as well as the courts
of justice, it is perceived there are compelling reasons for the restoration
of the death penalty as an effective deterrent against the commission of
heinous crimes and as matter of simple retributive justice.
Philippines: Possible Reintroduction of the Death Penalty, URGENT ACTION (Amnesty
Int'l, London, U.K.), Feb. 8, 1990.
394. Xinhua General News Service reported on January 21, 1993, that sixteen
of twenty-four Philippine Senators support restoration of the death penalty. Major
News Items in Leading Phillippine English Newspapers, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV.,
Jan. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File. The vote in Feb-
ruary resulted in a Senate Committee being charged to draw up a compromise bill
to be signed by President Ramos after further action by both houses. Telephone
Interview with Enid Harlow, Program Assistant, Amnesty International USA Pro-
gram to Abolish the Death Penalty (July, 13 1993).
395. PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 1992. The Spanish Penal Code of
1848, including the death penalty, was imposed on the Philippines in 1884. Under
United States rule, the 1932 Revised Penal Code provided the death penalty for
seven offenses. In 1941 it was extended to espionage. Case Studies, supra note
391, at 1-5. During the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s and 1980s,
numerous death sentences were imposed on political offenders, many by martial
law courts. WHEN THE STATE KILs, supra hote 369, at 191. Benigno Aquino was
among those sentenced to death by military tribunals, in 1977, and he was still
under this sentence when he was assassinated upon his return to the Philippines
in 1983. Case Studies, supra note 391, at 5. When President Corazon Aquino as-
sumed the presidency in 1987, she announced her intent to commute the more
than 500 death sentences then outstanding. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note
369, at 191. Despite the many politically motivated death sentences during the
Marcos regime, the last official execution in the Philippines took place in 1976, for
a common crime. WHEN THE STATE KULLS, supra note 369, at 191. In fact, Marcos
occasionally proposed measures to limit the death penalty to shore up the respect-
ability of his regime. Case Studies, supra note 391, at 8.
396. Amnesty International has testified against bills to reintroduce the death
penalty in the Philippines. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 369, at 191.
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same reassurance to an impatient public as President Fujimori
of Peru, 91 indicating how partial democratization under situ-
ations of great stress can strengthen the retentionist appeal.
The clash of symbols between abolition as a mark of democracy
and retention as a signal of responsiveness to public demand
has yet to be resolved.
C. Pakistan
Pakistan presents some of the same elements as the Phil-
ippine scenario-a newly elected democratic government sus-
pending the death penalty in revulsion against its political
abuse during a martial law regime, followed by a regime at-
tracted to the death penalty as an emblem of resolve to tackle
political unrest and rampant crime. In Pakistan, the symbolic
link of capital punishment to the aim of infusing public policy
with the principles of Islam plays a critical role. The influence
of Islam on death penalty debates varies greatly among Islamic
states,398 but the religious element has figured in Pakistan.
Recently, Pakistan's death penalty rhetoric at the national .and
international levels has also highlighted drug trafficking.99
Pakistan has had a judicial death penalty since its cre-
ation in 1947, but its application and the structures empow-
ered to impose it have fluctuated widely over the periods of
martial law and elected governments. The 1974-1985 period of
martial law had seen an especially high rate of executions,
397. Stoltz, supra note 390.
398. Islam itself is multifaceted, as Deniz Kandiyoti remarks, quoted in Donna
Sullivan, Gender Equality and Relrgious Freedom, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
795, 812 n.39 (1992):
Islam may be involved and evoked at all sorts of levels - in the cultur-
al practices of kin-based communities, in state ideologies incorporating
coherent legislative practices, in a more privatized religious conviction, in
organized and militant social movements, as a nod in the direction of
Muslim aid donors or internal political allies, or as a more diffuse dis-
course on national and cultural authenticity. The meaning and daily
reality of Islam can be so diverse as to justify the question, which Islam?
399. ECO Members to Co-Ordinate Anti-Drug Fight, REUTERS LIBR. REP., Apr.
26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
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including that of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979
after a military coup by President Zia Al-Haq.4 °° Bhutto's
daughter, Benazir Bhutto, instituted a moratorium and com-
muted 2000 death sentences on her election in December
1988.401 Benazir Bhutto in turn was removed from office
when her government was dissolved by President Ishaq Khan,
paving the way for the Islamic Democratic Alliance led by
Nawaz Sharif to take power in November 1990.402 Executions
resumed in Pakistan in 1992.403
The influence of Islamic fundamentalism is only one factor
explaining the prevalence of the death penalty in Pakistan.4'
Four sets of courts are currently empowered to impose death
sentences: ordinary courts, military courts during periods of
martial law, Special Courts for Speedy Trials, and religious
courts.4 5 The proliferation of courts and offenses providing
for the death penalty signals the government's desire to pres-
ent the death penalty as an answer to multiple issues. Yet-to-
be-implemented is an additional layer of "extraordinary" insti-
tutional and legal measures: the 1991 Terrorist Affected Areas
(Special Courts) Ordinance,4 6 which would empower yet an-
other "special" body to dispense death sentences outside. the
regular legal system.
Pakistan's leaders have regularly appealed to Islamic
fundamentalist support to solidify their power. President Zia
did so, through measures such as the Enforcement of Hudood
Ordinances of 1979.407 The government tried to associate it-
400. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 369, at 188.
401. WHEN THE STATE KILlS, supra note 369, at 189.
402. CoUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, Report to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 102-05, at 1586 (1991).
403. DEATH PENALTY NEWS, supra note 346, at 1.
404. Amnesty International reports that in 1991 over 200 death sentences were
imposed. Pakistan: Amnesty International Concerned About Executions, Amnesty In-
Vl, AI Index: ASA 33/WU02/92 (1992).
405. WHEN THE STATE KILlS, supra note 369, at 187-88.
406. Pakistan: Special Courts for Speedy Trial, Amnesty International, AI In-
dex: ASA 33/23/91 at 4 (1991).
407. Pakistan: Legal Changes Affecting Application of. the Death Penalty, AM.
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self with a return to Islamic values as interpreted by certain
religious leaders. For example, a 1981 decision by the federal
Shari'a Court that stoning was a punishment repugnant to
Islam was reversed after alteration in the court's composi-
tion.408
Under the current regime, Islamic concerns animate such
measures as a mandatory death penalty for defiling the name
of the Prophet.49 The first case imposing this penalty, the
death sentence of a Christian involved in a dispute with a
Muslim League campaign worker, has aroused international
attention410  that potentially strains the Pakistani
government's ability to defend its religiously based adherence
to the death penalty as a matter of its own internal concern.
Moreover, the treatment of women under Shari'a law attracts
international human rights scrutiny,4  as international
norms concerning gender justice as well as capital punishment
expose Pakistan to external human rights criticism.
D. South Africa
Unlike several of its Southern African neighbors, 412
South Africa has not yet embraced abolition as a symbol of its
commitment to democratization and social progress. South
Africa remains retentionist in a largely retentionist conti-
nent,418 where regional human rights norms barely touch on
NESTY INTERNATIONAL SUMMARY, Mar. 1991, at 3 (Amnesty Intl, New York, N.Y.,
AI Index: ASA 33/03/91).
408. WHEN THE STATE FULLS, supra note 369, at 188.
409. Pakistani Legal Changes: The Death Penalty Made Mandatory for Defiling
the Name of the Prophet Mohammad, AMNESTY INTL REPORT, Sept. 1991 (available
from Amnesty Intl, New York, N.Y., AI Index: ASA 33/09/91).
410. CATHOLIC NEW YORK, Nov. 26, 1992, at 4.
411. See Sullivan, supra note 398.
412. Namibia and Mozambique are both abolitionist, and Angola has taken
steps in the same direction. List, supra note 12.
413. Hood noted at the time of his study that only the Seychelles and Cape
Verde, among sub-Saharan African states, were de jure abolitionist though several
other states appeared to be abolitionist de facto. See HOOD, supra note 8, at 19-21.
Since that time, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Sao Tom6 and Prfncipe,
and possibly Angola, have become abolitionist. List, supra note 12; DEATH PENALTY
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the issue of the death penalty.414 But South Africa is a spe-
cial case. South Africa has had an effective moratorium on the
death penalty since 1990,"' and capital punishment remains
a bargaining chip in the on-going negotiations toward multi-
racial democracy. With indisputable evidence that the death
penalty had been deeply infected with race bias and had in fact
functioned as a tool of apartheid, the African National Con-
gress and other anti-apartheid groups have demanded a mora-
torium on non-political as well as political applications of the
death penalty as a prerequisite for constitutional negotia-
tions.416
NEWS, supra note 346. The prevalence of the death penalty in Africa is frequently
explained on grounds that 'countries suffering from political instability, where the
state has difficulties in maintaining order, [regard] the death penalty ... as an
essential instrument of security, the abandonment of which would be interpreted
as a sign of weakness." HOOD, supra note 8, at 21. See also A.A. Adeyemi, Death
Penalty: Criminological Perspectives, the Nigerian Situation, 58 R.I.D.P. 485 (1987).
Yet, the death penalty is a legacy of the colonial experience and not indigenous to
African cultures. As the Chief Justice of Zimbabwe explained:
In Zimbabwe there was no death sentence passed on those who
committed murder. The Shona inhabitants of Zimbabwe did not believe in
taking away another human being's life because they believed that his
spirit would return to torment them .... The penalty for killing anoth-
er person was an award of damages to the guardian or family of the
person killed. The damages were a form of punishment. They were also a
form of compensation for the loss of a member of the aggrieved family.
E. Dumbutshena, The Death Penalty in Zimbabwe, 58 R.I.D.P. 521 (1987). The
death penalty was introduced in 1890 by British settlers. The experience of Zimba-
bwe, in having no tradition of the death penalty until the colonial period, is typi-
cal of sub-Saharan Africa. See generally AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS (Alan Milner ed.,
1969); JAMES S.E. OPOLOT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND NATION BUILDING IN AFRICA
(1976); A.S. DIAMOND, PiRrl LAW 161-93 (1935).
414. The African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights makes at best oblique
and ambiguous reference to the death penalty in its Article 4:
Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled
to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be
arbitrarily deprived of this right.
June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CABLEGI67/3 Rev.5 (1981).
415. Nathan V. Holt, Jr., Human Rights and Capital Punishment: The Case of
South Africa, 30 VA. J. INVL L. 273, 317 (1989).
416. Dennis Davis, The Historical and Jurisprudential Evolution and Back-
ground to the Application of the Death Penalty and Its Relationship with Constitu-
tional and Political Reform (Mar. 28, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author, Alice Miller); Inside South Africa's Death Factory, Black Sash Reserch
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The South African government has suggested that proce-
dural reforms could cure the death penalty of the taint of link-
age to apartheid."' The current rise in crime and the per-
ceived need to reassure the white constituency about the re-
sults of transition to majority rule led the government to seek,
and obtain, a vote from Parliament to lift the moratorium in
June 1993.418
Causes celebres such as the case of the "Uppington 14","'"
attracting high levels of international public scrutiny, taught
the South African government the costs of political uses of the
death penalty. The lifting of the moratorium was perceived by
opponents as a "cynical public relations stunt" to mollify
whites, while actual executions would continue to be stayed to
avoid derailing the negotiations for constitutional transition to
majority rule.4 0 The current level of violence in South Africa
risks diluting the identification of the death penalty with- the
human rights abuses of the apartheid regime.421 The other
Project (Feb. 1989).
417. See Jan van Rooyen, South Africa's New Death Sentence: Is the Bell Toll-
ing for the Hangman?, 4 S. AFE. J. CRIM. JUST. 79 (1991).
418. Anton Ferreira, De Kierk Seen Reassuring Whites in Key Speech, REUTER
LiB. REP., Jan. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File; Jona-
than Manthorpe, S. Africa to Enrol Paramilitary Groups in Neighborhood Watch,
THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Jan. 30, 1993, at B7 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
MONGAZ File (Quoting President F.W. de Kerk as saying, "The wave of cruel
murders and manslaughter, the prevailing disrespect for human lives and the
delays in negotation make it very difficult for the government to allow the morato-
rium to continue indefinitely"); John Carlin, Hanging Debate to Mollify SA Right,
THE INDEPENDENT, June 18, 1993, at 13; S. Africa's Parliament Votes to Reintro-
duce Hanging, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 17, 1993 available in, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, AFP File.
419. Holt, supra note 415, at 315.
420. Paul Stober, South Africa: Executions Unlikely as Opposition Mounts, IN-
TER PRESS SERVICE, June 22, 1993 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES
File.
421. South Africa: Voices on the Death Penalty; DEATH PENALTY NEWS Feb.
1992 (available from Amnesty Int'l, New York, N.Y., AI Index: ACT 53/01/92) (a
radio call-in show in November 1991 aimed at township residents attracted a
majority of callers favoring retention of hanging in a newly democratic South Afri-
ca).
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actors in the constitutional negotiations appear adamant that
abolition be one of the prices for transition to democracy.'
IX. CONCLUSION
The death penalty as a concept is dependent upon the
construct of the "state" and a set of assumptions about the
state's power over individuals. The state's emergence and dis-
placement of pre-existing mechanisms of vengeance or recom-
pense created the death penalty.4" As long as the state has
existed and assumed the power to exterminate-deliberately,
upon reflection, and without immediate danger-those who
have transgressed its laws, people have debated the proper
grounds, and the very legitimacy, of this punishment. The
retention or abolition of the death penalty necessarily conveys
the lawgivers' assumptions about the relationship between the
state and those subject to its penal authority.
Why is the death penalty a human rights issue? When
participants to the discourse analyzed here talk about the
death penalty as a human rights issue, they are often speaking
of very different things. Is the death penalty a human rights
issue because it is another, particularly terrible, tool of politi-
cal repression? The Latin American abolitionist tradition has
clearly been influenced by this perception, and the American
422. The Information Chief of the African National Congress (ANC) reacted to
de Kerk's speech by complaining that his examples of rampant crime concerned
only white property owners and not black commuters victimized by the 'national
scandal of train violence." Ferreira, supra note 418. He did not suggest imposition
of the death penalty, however, and asserted that the contours for a Bill of Rights
must be negotiated and not legislated by the existing government. Michael
Hamlyn, De Kierk Urges Democracy to Prevent War, THE TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TTIMES File. Matthew Phosa, head of the
ANC's legal department, reacted to the vote to lift the moratorium by strdssing
the ANC's strong opposition to the death penalty. Stober, supra note 420.
423. Draco, the earliest known legislator of Athens, is largely remembered for
the severity of his criminal laws, including the prescription of the death penalty
for many forms of homicide and even for trivial thefts. DIAMOND, supra note 413,
at 149-52 (noting Draco's influence on the transformation of homicide from a pri-
vate civil wrong into a criminal offense against the community, subject to sanc-
tions by government authority).
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Convention specifically prohibits capital punishment for politi-
cal offenses. 41 International attention to summary and arbi-
trary executions emanated largely from a concern that repres-
sive governments were slaughtering their citizens to achieve
certain political aims. The ends sought, as well as the means
used, by these oppressor governments raised human rights
concerns. Abolition by newly democratic states signals their
repudiation of a tool tainted by its misuse for purposes of polit-
ical repression.
But human rights are not simply about the enjoyment of
political freedoms. They embody a concept of what it means to
be human, and of what that simple human status implies.
Central to the concept of universal human rights is the as-
sumption that the life and dignity of each individual human
being have value, even for those individuals least valued with-
in their own societies. For many, acceptance of this fundamen-
tal principle leads inexorably to the conclusion that the state
cannot deliberately take life, even to accomplish important
social goals. These assumptions reflect a view of the state as
limited in the scope of its legitimate power against the dignity
claims of individual human beings.
The postwar concept of universal human rights also re-
flects the inheritance of Western thought from the Enlighten-
ment period, an optimism about the possibility of steady pro-
gression toward a more humane and peaceful society. Aboli-
tionist movements at the national as well as international level
have been profoundly influenced by these assumptions, so
clearly embedded in the UN's commitment to gradual abolition.
When optimism about, and commitment to, social progress is
at a high point, frequently movements toward the abolition of
the death penalty also achieve their zenith.4"5
Disillusionment and fear feed retentionist impulses. The
death penalty becomes for many a positive symbol of state
power, not of political repression or absolutism but of compe-
424. O-.S.T.S. No. 36, supra note 17, art. 4(4).
425. See BEDAU, supra note 289.
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tence, strength and reassurance. 1 6 In unstable societies with
newly unleashed populist demands, the death penalty can
become a tempting device for demonstrating the regime's re-
sponsiveness to the immediate concerns of the vocal citizenry.
The death penalty then takes on a positive human rights aura,
as a policy of direct democracy and a means to insure the basic
rights and security of those threatened by crime or insurgency.
The religious aspect of recent international discourse on
the death penalty reflects many of these same factors. The
death penalty on the national level embodies the regime's
commitment to bind together the community by infusing. the
laws with religious values and by eliminating nonconforming
elements within the society.
At the international level, the death penalty becomes a
rallying point for the developing world in its struggle for power
against the traditionally dominant actors on the international
stage. While still seeking to "develop" economically and thus
tied to the Western notion of "progress," they bristle at sugges-
tions that their penal practices are socially backward or bar-
baric, or that there is a universal goal of gradual abolition as
part of a general progress toward greater humaneness in gov-
ernment. The death penalty, with its apparent link to specific
cultural values, figures as an element in the growing challenge
by developing countries to the very idea of universal human
rights.
Insulating themselves from criticism for retaining the
death penalty becomes part of a broader agenda for raising the
barrier of domestic govereignty against human rights scrutiny
of any kind. In this, the retentionists in the developing world
are joined by retentionists from the developed world, especially
the United States and Japan.42 The latter appear to be moti-
vated by cynicism about international human rights rather
than by religious fervor or smoldering resentment against
second class status. Their retentionist policies are driven more
426. See BEDAU, supra note 289, at 246.
427. See supra note 366.
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by reaction to public opinion polls4" than by any enduring
cultural values or assessment that capital punishment is a
concretely valuable penological tool.
The lessons for the future of abolitionist efforts on the
international level are not greatly encouraging. While abolition
has not lost its rhetorical force as a symbol of respect for hu-
man dignity and constraint upon the often-abused powers of
the state, societies responding to its call will likely remain
limited in number. Backsliding from heady abolitionist com-
mitments is likely to recur in the highly unstable conditions
confronted by many states. The recourse to public opinion
without a concommitant effort to educate the public about the
actual operation of the death penalty contributes to this back-
sliding. The abolitionist protocols do not seem capable of serv-
ing as a vehicle for a radical transformation in a process that
has been underway for at least the last two hundred years.
428. See BEDAU, supra note 289, at 145-65; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN 19 (1983).
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